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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this study is to find out whether North European firms follow the pecking 
order theory in their annual financing decisions. The hypotheses propose that the pecking 
order behavior is strong but weakens after the financial crisis. The effect of tightening 
financial regulation and various sub groups of firms are studied separately. North 
European economies differ from other developed economies in having a bank-centered 
financing environment which provides a relatively new and interesting environment to 
study firms’ annual financing decisions. 
 
The sample data from 2005 to 2014 consists of all publicly listed Finnish, Swedish, 
Norwegian, Danish and Icelandic firms with sufficient financial data available. Sufficient 
financial data enables studying annual financing decisions with various proxies for 
changes in firm capital structure and on various sub groups of firms. All regressions are 
adjusted for year and firm fixed effects in order to control for the effects of corporate 
restructurings and to reduce potential endogeneity problems 
 
The results show strong support for pecking order behavior in Nordic firms’ annual 
financing decisions. Previous studies have found evidence both for and against which 
implies that time period and market characteristics have an effect on firm financing 
decisions. Despite studying a variety of sub groups, the evidence is strong for all types of 
firms in the North European economies. The main implication is that all listed firms in 
the North Europe behave similarly in terms of their financing decisions.  
 
One of the main purposes of this paper is studying the effect of tightening financial 
regulation. Utilising a dummy variable to study differences between two periods, the 
results are able to find positive and significant yet only a small difference in firm 
financing decisions. The results indicate that firms have begun to more diversify their 
funding after the financial crisis.  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
KEYWORDS: Pecking order, capital structure, North Europe, financial crisis 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) suggest that firm capital structure and thus financing 
decisions are irrelevant in perfect and efficient markets. Relaxing their assumptions 
brings up two important questions, what is the optimal choice between equity and debt 
financing and what is the optimal capital structure for firm? The pecking order theory is 
considered to be one of the most influential theories of firm capital structure decisions. 
The idea of a pecking order on financing instruments is widely studied but also a topic 
subject to controversy.  
 
Myers (1984) argues that adverse selection and information asymmetry cause firms to 
prefer internal financing over external financing. When internal financing is insufficient, 
firms choose debt over equity due to lower information costs. Information costs can be 
addressed as possible mispricing of equity while debt is generally associated with a lower 
probability of mispricing. Equity financing is seen as a less cost efficient financing 
instrument and is thus used only when firms are debt constraint. Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999) process the ideas of Myers (1984) into testable model, close to the one 
utilised in this paper.  
 
Much research has been published related to pecking order theory. Various tests have 
been conducted on different markets and time periods with the model proposed by 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). In addition numerous researchers have tested the 
implications arising from the pecking order theory. Yet the evidence is relatively scattered 
and no clear consensus exists. For example papers studying solely US based firms find 
evidence both against and in favor of pecking order theory (see e.g. Lemmon and Zender, 
2010; Frank and Goyal, 2003). Most of the research has been conducted on a broad 
sample of firms without any clear effort to isolate non-debt constraint firms. Therefore 
the mixed results achieved during the past 15 years are more or less expectable.  
 
The generalised empirical model of pecking order theory, as suggested by Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers (1999), tests whether firm financing deficit is matched with an equal change 
in firm balance sheet interest bearing debt. The financing deficit item is supposed to 
include all cash flows and therefore function as a good proxy for external financing 
requirement. Thus if all observed firms follow pecking order theory a unit slope 
coefficient is found. A lower coefficient would mean that some part of annual financing 
deficit is financed with equity and a higher coefficient would mean that firms are 
gathering slump sums of cash by issued additional debt. Previous research has found the 
10 
 
coefficient to vary between 0.2 and 0.8 which clearly indicates both weak and strong 
support for the pecking order theory.  
 
De Haan and Hinloopen (2003) find a slightly differing pecking order of bank debt over 
equity but equity over bond financing. This raises a question whether the differences of 
previous research could be explained by the differences in available debt instruments? 
Interestingly Modigliani and Perotti (1997) find that the level of legal enforcement, 
especially in financial market regulation, appears to explain some differences of firms’ 
financing decisions between different countries. Most of the previous research has studied 
US market which is highly bond financing based. This rises the demand for further studies 
of pecking order theory in different markets. 
 
This paper extends the work of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal 
(2003) by studying a highly bank-centered lending environment in Northern Europe. The 
data sample consists of publicly traded firms in Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and 
Iceland over the 2005 to 2014 period. As the aftermath of financial crisis introduced 
changes to financial market regulation, the effect of regulatory reforms on firm financing 
decisions is also studied. 
 
The financing deficit component is constructed of annual dividend payments, net 
investments, changes in working capital and operative cash flow. Thus the only 
requirement for Nordic firms is to have sufficient information available of these items.  
The evidence of 547 Nordic firms generally supports the pecking order theory as a vast 
majority of annual financing deficit is covered with debt issues, both bank and bond debt. 
The empirical evidence is in line with or even stronger than most of the other studies 
conducted on European firms.  
 
The thesis is constructed in the following way. The theoretical part is included in chapters 
2 and 3. The second chapter gives an introduction to common capital structure theories. 
In the third chapter a general overview of corporate financing environment in the studied 
countries is given. The fourth chapter presents data, hypotheses and methodologies. The 
results are presented in the fifth chapter and the sixth chapter discusses and compares the 
results to selected comparable studies. The seventh chapter concludes. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this chapter general capital structure theories are presented. The most relevant capital 
structure theories for this study are presented more closely in sections 2.1-2.3. Theory of 
adverse selection and asymmetric information serves as the main theoretical background 
for this study. It creates the basis for understanding firms’ choice of financing operative 
cash flow deficit. Trade-off theory on the other hand tries to explain the choice of capital 
structure rather than how financing deficit is financed. Section 2.4 presents a brief 
introduction to other relevant capital structure theories such as agency costs, relationship 
between firm capital structure and growth as well as firm operative strategy as a capital 
structure determinant. 
 
The empirical tests in this study test the applicability of pecking order theory which stems 
from adverse selection and asymmetric information. Other theories help to understand the 
differences of pecking order theory’s applicability between countries which is also a 
major part of this study. Thus a general introduction to other important theories such as 
trade-off theory and agency cost theory is justified. A closer introduction to some of the 
most noteworthy empirical studies of pecking order theory is presented in section 2.2. 
The empirical tests in this paper closely follow studies from Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003). Also in order to provide perspective some selected 
empirical results for other theories are briefly presented in their respective sections. 
 
It shoud also be noted that multiple capital structure theories can apply to financial 
markets at the same time. Some theories are focused on annual financing decisions while 
some on optimal capital structure. Therefore firms can follow one theory in annual 
financing decisions but also adjust their capital structure in the long-run. Thus small 
violations in empirical results from one theory do not mean that the theory does not apply 
but rather that there might exists other factors or reasons which also determine firms’ 
behavior.  
 
2.1. THE MODIGLIANI-MILLER THEOREM OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
IRRELEVANCY 
 
The foundation of the theory of firm’s average cost of capital and thus the firm’s capital 
structure can be traced back to Modigliani-Miller theorem of capital structure. The 
original paper (Modigliani & Miller 1958) makes three proposals concluding that firms’ 
capital structure is irrelevant in a world without taxes, bankruptcy costs, agency costs or 
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information asymmetries. This obviously implies that if these factors exist then firm 
capital structure choice is driven by these or some other factors. The paper proposes that 
in efficient capital markets arbitrageurs correct any price differences resulting from 
differences in the asset’s financing structure. The theorem thus creates a basis for 
observing the effects of violating these assumptions. 
 
The first proposal states that in equilibrium the value of an asset is independent of its 
capital structure. The proposition suggests that it is irrelevant whether a stream of income 
is generated from equity or debt if they are similar in all meaningful aspects. Therefore 
two equivalent income streams of a firm must also be equally priced or an arbitrageur 
could exploit the discrepancy by for example buying lower priced stock and selling higher 
priced bond (Modigliani et al. 1958: 271). Hence a firm cannot change the value of its 
businesses by changing debt to equity or vice versa. 
 
The second proposal states that a firm’s average cost of capital is a linear function of the 
firm’s leverage ratio. Given that the cost of debt is constant at all levels of leverage, the 
average cost of capital of a firm is the relative combination of its levered cost of equity 
and its cost of debt with respect to its current capital structure. Therefore the average cost 
of capital is constant at different levels of debt as the levered cost of equity increases with 
higher leverage. (Modigliani et al. 1958: 269) 
 
The third proposal concludes the first and second proposals. In the third proposal a firm 
should always execute an investment opportunity if the rate of return on the investment 
is equal or higher than the firm’s average cost of capital. As suggested earlier, firm’s 
average cost of capital is independent on its capital structure. As a consequence the choice 
of investing is independent on the type of security it is financed with.  
 
Modigliani et al. note that actual capital markets have various inefficiencies. Practically 
every legislation allows interest payments to be deducted from taxable income. Therefore 
as an extension to the basic theorem of capital structure irrelevancy, Modigliani et al. 
(1958: 272-281) revise some of the assumptions to illustrate market conditions more 
realistically. Firstly, corporate taxation is accounted in the theory. Interest payment 
deductibility alters the basic propositions as the average cost of capital is no longer 
identical with different levels of leverage. As leverage lowers tax payments, the average 
cost of capital decreases with higher leverage. Therefore the value of a levered firm equals 
the value of an unlevered firm and the value of tax shield generated by debt. Furthermore 
this implies that an optimal capital structure for a firm is achieved by being completely 
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financed with debt if bankruptcy costs are excluded. In other words bankruptcy costs 
combined with leverage determine the optimal capital structure for a firm. 
 
Secondly, due to the existence of variation in interest rates the interest expenses of a firm 
tend to increase with higher leverage. The cost of borrowing additional funds increases 
with leverage but is evened out by an equivalent decrease in firm’s cost of equity funding. 
Therefore the average cost of capital from all sources of funding is still independent of 
the firm’s capital structure with the exception of the tax effect. (Modigliani et al. 1958: 
272- 274) 
 
Despite the Modigliani-Miller propositions being criticised and subject to controversy 
(see e.g. Durand 1989; Rose 1959; Stiglitz 1967) they have been accepted as an 
implication of equilibrium in perfect capital markets (Miller 1988). In order to illustrate 
capital structure decisions in real world capital markets several additional theories with 
relaxed MM assumptions have been developed. As a result it has been argued that the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem of capital structure irrelevancy does not describe a realistic 
image of firm financing but instead provides a basis for examining why the way of 
financing may matter (Frank & Goyal 2005: 7). Broad studies of Harris and Raviv (1991) 
and Feld, Heckemeyer and Overesch (2011) show that theories of agency costs, corporate 
control, information asymmetry, utilisation of tax benefits and product-input markets as 
capital structure determinants have been empirically successful in describing firm 
financing behavior and chosen leverage level.  
 
2.2. ADVERSE SELECTION AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
 
In his book Donaldson (1961) studies financing patterns of large firms and observes that 
firms favor internal financing over external financing. In a financing deficit firms’ issue 
debt over equity which implies a pecking order of internal over external financing and 
debt over equity financing. Later Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) follow that 
the pecking order of financing derives from information asymmetry between existing 
stockholders and firm management. Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) argue 
that due to information asymmetry raising equity to finance a positive net present value 
(NPV) project involves uncertainty of the price of the issued equity. Thus raising 
overpriced equity might turn a positive net present value project negative. Therefore firms 
with insufficient internal financing and investment opportunities with positive NPV 
sometimes rather forego the opportunity than issue undervalued risky securities. It is 
therefore generally preferable to issue safe than risky securities as safe securities are 
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considered to involve less undervaluation. Debt is considered safer than equity as debt 
securities have generally higher protection against bankruptcy.  
 
In their paper Myers and Majluf (1984: 46-47) conclude that stockholders are better off 
when firms build excess cash through restricting dividend payment. This derives from 
being able to execute positive NPV investment opportunities when they rise compared to 
being forced to use external financing. This is obviously more evident for more profitable 
companies. Therefore more profitable firms should have lower leverage ratio (see e.g. 
Hovakimian, Opler & Titman 2001; Titman & Wessels 1988). 
 
Many researchers have further studied the choice between debt and equity financing and 
whether the choice is as simple as stated by Myers (1984). For example Cadsby, Frank 
and Maksimovic (1998) and Noe (1989) examine the possibility of several equilibriums 
of the debt-equity choice of financing due to asymmetric information between investors 
and management. They conclude that there in fact exist multiple equilibriums and factors 
such as signaling opportunity, learning and path dependence dominate over formal 
equilibrium selection. Investors seem to pay more attention to market prices than 
theoretical prices. (Cadsby et al. 1998: 226). Also if debt financing options which have 
equity characteristics (e.g. convertible or hybrid bonds) are available then firms’ 
preference for debt over equity may not be as simple as previously stated (Cadsby et al. 
1998). 
  
Halov and Heider (2004) argue that if firm issues debt with default risk then it is not 
evident that asymmetric information leads to preference of debt over equity. They show 
that there in fact exists two extremes as if there is no asymmetric information of the firm’s 
risk then debt is preferred. And vice versa if there is only asymmetric information of the 
firm’s riskiness then equity is preferred. Therefore there exists a relationship between 
investors acknowledging the firm’s riskiness and the debt-equity preference (Halov & 
Heider 2004: 2)  
 
In order to counter the adverse selection issue of equity financing Eckbo and Masulis 
(1992) and later Eckbo and Norli (2004) have studied the effects of allowing current 
shareholders to participate in new equity financing. In their paper Eckbo and Norli (2004) 
observe a pecking order of equity floatation method choices meaning that firms 
anticipating active participation of current shareholders face low adverse selection and 
thus prefer to issue uninsured rights. On the other hand firms that expect low participation 
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from current shareholders generally issue underwritten equity rights. (Eckbo and Norli 
2004: 29-31) 
 
Fama and French (2002) observe that larger and financially stable firms (i.e. dividend 
paying firms) prefer debt financing when retained earnings are insufficient without 
reducing dividend payments. Smaller firms (i.e. those which do not pay dividends) also 
prefer debt for short-term financing requirement while equity is preferred for long-term 
financing requirement. Equity preference for financially weaker firms is in line with 
pecking order through the risk factor however Fama and French (2002: 30) find that in 
fact lower leverage has historically correlated with larger equity issues for firms with no 
annual dividend payments. In their broad study Harris and Raviv (1991) list various 
complementing results of leverage increasing with decreasing profitability and with firm 
value. 
 
One of the most renowned empirical tests on Myers and Majluf’s (1986) pecking order 
theory is Shyam-Sunders and Myers (1999) paper. They studied 157 large US firms which 
had continuous data available from 1971 to 1989. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) tested 
both the static trade-off theory and the pecking order theory. First they build a model in 
which a unit of financing deficit should result in an even change in firm debt. Thus the 
slope coefficient in pecking order theory should be one. Financing deficit derives from 
firm cash flows being inadequate to finance annual dividends, investments and change 
sin working capital. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) find the slope coefficient to vary 
between 0.69 and 0.85 with coefficient of determination varying between 0.68 and 0.86 
(table 2 on page 230 in Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999). They show that firms’ financing 
deficit is mostly financed with debt which they interpret as supportive evidence for 
pecking order theory. 
 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers’ (1999) paper invoked discussion and studies of pecking order 
theory. Similar paper from Frank and Goyal (2003) studies pecking order theory on a 
broader range of firms and longer period. Their sample consists of 768 firms operating 
from 1971 to 1998. They show results which are contrary to those from Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers (1999). While firms do use external financing the preferance for debt is not 
evident. With the same model, restrictions and time period (as used in Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers 1999) Frank and Goyal (2003) find the beta coefficient and coefficient of 
determinations to be lower for their broader range of firms. They report that the pecking 
order theory performs best among the largest firms. Also a sub-sample of firms with 
strictly positive dividends receives relatively high beta coefficient and explanatory power.  
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Frank and Goyal (2003) also find that pecking order theory performs even weaker with 
the 1990s data: The explanatory power seems to decay over time. This was also suggested 
by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) who argued that low R² in 1980s is explained by 
firms undertaking leveraged restructurings. Thus it seems that the pecking order theory 
does well among large and stable firms but other factors have begun to drive firm 
financing decisions. Bharath, Pasquariello and Wu (2009) study financing behavior of US 
firms over the period of 1973-2002. They used an information asymmetry index as an 
additional variable in the standard financial deficit based model. Bharath et al. (2009) find 
that information asymmetry does enhance the explanatory power of the standard pecking 
order model.  
 
Myers (1984) also notes that firms should prefer negotiable bank debt over public debt 
which is usually issued in standard terms. De Haan and Hinloopen (2003) study financing 
decisions of 153 firms from 1984 to 1997. They estimate ordered probit models for each 
possible financing hierarchies between internal financing, bank debt, public bonds and 
equity issues. Results support pecking order theory but face an unexpected difference 
between equity issues and bonds. Bank financing is preferred over equity issues but equity 
issues are preferred over bonds. They propose that the difference originates from relative 
underdevelopment of Dutch bond market. The level of developed of corporate lending 
market in a particular country seems to play an important role in firm financing decisions. 
Esho, Sharpe and Wu (2001) find that firms from countries with developed corporate 
lending market are more likely to be able to access international lending markets. They 
also find significant differences in the determinants of financing instruments between 
countries with different levels of corporate lending market development. 
 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanez, Schleifer and Vishny (1997) show that legal environment of 
corporate finance and quality of its enforcement vary significantly between countries. 
They show that the legal environment (French, English, German or Scandinavian) has an 
important role in determining the relative indebtedness of firms and size of external equity 
market. Modigliani and Perotti (1997) stress the same issues through enforcement of 
regulation. They argue that the level of enforcement is an important determinant in firm’s 
choice between equity and bank debt financing. 
 
De Fiore and Uhlig (2005) present differences between US and European corporate 
lending market. Generally corporate lending market is divided between bond and bank 
financing. Bank financing includes both bilateral and syndicated loans while bond 
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financing consists of all types of publicly traded corporate bonds. De Fiore and Uhlig 
(2005) report that in the early 2000s bank to bond finance ratio was approximately 0.7 in 
US and 5.5 in Europe while debt to equity ratio was on average 0.4 in US and 0.6 in 
Europe. De Haan and Hinloopen (2003) argue that the pecking order between equity 
financing, bonds and bank debt seems to be dependent on the local financing market. As 
a conclusion the results from De Fiore and Uhlig (2005) and De Haan and Hinloopen 
raise an interesting question whether the applicability of pecking order theory actually 
depends on the characteristics of the local financing market. Since empirical studies have 
been mostly executed with US based firms. The latest conclusion among researchers is 
that the pecking order theory is not the driving factor in firm financing decisions. The 
possibility of the underlying market conditions affecting the applicability of the pecking 
order theory creates a demand to conduct further tests in a bank concentrated lending 
market.  
 
2.3. TRADE-OFF THEORY 
 
Trade-off theory derives from Modigliani-Miller capital structure irrelevancy theorem 
and particularly from the tax-added model which implies that an optimal capital structure 
for a firm is achieved by being completely financed with debt if bankruptcy costs are 
excluded. According to the theory an optimal capital structure for a firm, in a world where 
bankruptcy costs exist, derives from a trade-off between the value of interest tax shields 
and the costs of bankruptcy. The classical trade-off theory (see e.g. Baxter 1967, Kraus 
and Litzenberger 1973, Scott 1976) proposes that firms set a target leverage ratio which 
maximises interest tax shields while minimising costs of bankruptcy thus resulting in an 
optimal capital structure. After setting the optimal leverage ratio firms then gradually 
move towards the target. Dynamic trade-off theory on the other hand considers capital 
structure policy as a continuous process. The theory is based on firms refinancing 
periodically, generating equity continuously and distributing funds periodically. Thus 
their leverage ratios can be expected to fluctuate and deviate from theoretical optimal 
level (Goldstein, Ju & Leland 2001). 
 
2.3.1. STATIC TRADE-OFF THEORY 
 
A simple presentation of the static trade-off theory is illustrated in figure 1. And a more 
advanced presentation of the static trade-off theory is presented by Bradley, Jarrell and 
Kim (1984). Their single-period model accounts for the trade-off between the benefits 
and costs of debt, the agency costs of debt as presented by Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
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and the effects of non-debt tax shields as well as the differences between personal and 
corporate taxation presented by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980). However an illustration 
of Bradley et al. (1984) model is close to that in figure 1. The empirical evidence is 
somewhat mixed on the static trade-off theory. For example Bradley et al. (1984) find 
that optimal leverage ratio is negatively related to bankruptcy costs and to the amount of 
non-debt tax shields. They also find that if bankruptcy costs are substantial then optimal 
leverage ratio is also negatively related to volatility of firm profitability. The results 
generally support the theory of firms setting optimal leverage ratio and gradually moving 
towards it apart from the negative relationship between leverage and non-debt tax shields. 
On the contrary for example Titman and Wessels (1988) have found less promising results 
of relation between debt tax shields and bankruptcy costs by using different proxies for 
leverage, bankruptcy costs and profitability.  
 
Frank and Goyal (2005) present some valid critique on Bradley et al. (1984) paper. Firstly, 
most of the model’s factors are not observable and thus proxies must be used. Frank and 
Goyal (2005) argue that the negative relationship between leverage and non-debt tax 
shields could in fact stem from the use of wrong proxies. Lastly they argue that the model 
lacks some key factors such as retained earnings and does not take into account possible 
mean reversion of capital structure. Some other relevant static trade-off studies such as 
ones from Opler and Titman (1994) and Jalilvand and Harris (1984) find clear evidence 
that firms do adjust towards target debt ratios.  
 
Interestingly, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999: 221-223) provide an alternative 
conclusion, arguing that many earlier researchers have misinterpreted their results. They 
argue that the supportive results could as well derive from mean reversion in debt ratios. 
Thus empirical results have not been able to confirm whether a firm’s adjusting behavior 
is a result of trade-off between costs and benefits of debt or reversion towards industry 
mean. They point out that e.g. results from Masulis (1980) of firm equity issues resulting 
in negative changes in firm’s security prices do not support static trade-off theory. Also 
for example Titman and Wessels (1988) have found negative relationship between firm 
profitability and leverage ratios which should, according to trade-off theory, be positive. 
Thus it seems that despite a static tradeoff model yielding supportive results other studies 
testing the underlying assumptions of the theory show less promising results. As a 
conclusion static trade-off theory has received relatively contradictive results depending 
on theoretical approach and estimation methods as presented by Harris and Raviv (1991).  
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2.3.2. DYNAMIC TRADE-OFF THEORY 
 
Empirical evidence shows that actual firm debt ratios seem to vary relatively widely 
between firms in same industry. Therefore firms either deviate from target capital 
structure on purpose or targets are misunderstood by researchers. Myers (1984) argues 
that relatively low determination coefficients of static trade-off theory derive from 
adjustment costs firms face when adjusting their capital structure. The classical static 
trade-off theory excludes adjustment costs, market expectations and uncertainty. These 
presented factors usually develop continuously and therefore in order to account for these 
factors static model has to be developed into a dynamic model. Kane, Marcus and 
McDonald (1984), Brennan and Schwartz (1984) and Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner 
(1989) have been major contributors to the dynamic trade-off theory. 
 
First versions of dynamic models (e.g. Kane et al. 1984; Brennan & Schwartz 1984) 
suggested that optimal leverage includes a dynamic aspect (Brennan and Schwartz 1984) 
and that the trade-off between costs and benefits of debt has a minor role in firm financial 
policy (Kane et al. 1984). These contradicting results were later analysed by Fischer et al. 
(1989) and further developed into an advanced model in which firms were able to 
recapitalise but faced transaction costs while doing so. Fischer et al. (1989) argue that 
firms do not have a single optimal leverage ratio but an optimal range deriving from 
Figure 1. Firms choose a debt level which maximises the market value. Shyam-Sunders & Myers (1999: 
220) 
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adjustment costs. Their main contribution is to “determine the critical upper and lower 
financial leverage ratios at which transaction costs are incurred to rebalance the firm’s 
financial structure” (Fischer et al. 1989: 20).  
 
Fischer et al. (1989) suggest that transaction costs lead to lag in firm financial policy 
execution which in turn explains differences in intra-industry leverage levels. Their 
results provide evidence of transaction costs having great importance in firm rebalancing 
behavior. They show that benefits of debt are greater with higher corporate tax rate and 
lower with personal tax rate (which is consistent with DeAngelo & Masulis 1980). 
Volatility of earnings negatively correlates with industry mean leverage ratio and higher 
volatility firms also let their leverage ratios fluctuate more heavily. The results imply that 
firms which are smaller, riskier, have lower tax rate and lower bankruptcy costs 
experience larger variation in their leverage ratios over time. 
 
Goldstein et al. (2001) show that since in reality firms refinance periodically, generate 
equity continuously and distribute funds periodically then their leverage ratios can be 
expected to fluctuate and deviate from theoretical optimal level. Empirical findings 
generally support their predictions (see figure 2) however they note that the model biases 
the optimal capital structure downward. Thus one should be careful when modeling 
downward recapitalisations which take place when firms face financial distress and break 
debt covenants. Issues affecting downward recapitalisations comprise equity related 
Figure 2. A typical sample path of firm value with log-normal dynamics. Goldstein et al. (1980: 500) 
Figure 2 shows that initially, firm value is 𝑽𝑶
𝟎 . Period 0 ends either by firm value reaching 𝑽𝑩
𝟎 , at which 
point the firm declares bankruptcy, or by firm value reaching 𝑽𝑼
𝟎 , at which point the debt is recalled and the 
firm again chooses an optimal capital structure. Note that the initial firm value at the beginning of period 1 
is 𝑽𝑶
𝟏  = 𝑽𝑼
𝟎  = 𝜸𝑽𝑶
𝟎 . Due to log-normal firm dynamics, it will be optimal to choose 𝑽𝑼
𝒏  = 𝜸 
𝒏𝑽𝑼
𝟎 , 𝑽𝑩
𝒏  = 𝜸𝑽𝑼
𝟎 .   
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concessions in financial distress, asset substitution, U.S. Chapter 11 protection (and 
similar bankruptcy related laws in other countries) and asymmetric information. 
(Goldstein et al. 1980) 
 
2.4. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF OTHER CAPITAL STRUCTURE THEORIES 
 
Capital structure theories based on agency costs, leverage and growth, and strategic 
choices on capital structure determination are presented in this section. 
 
2.4.1. AGENCY COSTS AND BENEFITS OF DEBT 
 
Agency costs associated with debt are considered an alternative theory of capital structure 
determination. Traditional agency theory of ownership structure was first proposed by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) by combining the theories of agency costs, property rights 
and finance. They argue that empirical findings of suboptimal debt levels derive from 
agency costs associated with debt. These agency costs consist of value decreasing impact 
of debt as managers undertake risky value decreasing investments, monitoring expenses 
caused by bondholders and managers, and bankruptcy and liquidation costs (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976: 51).  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that agency costs discourage the use of debt but on 
the other hand tax deductibility of interest payments encourages the use of debt. In other 
words according to agency theory, the optimal use of debt derives from a trade-off 
between tax deductibility of interest expenses and agency costs. Thus it can be considered 
as a revised version of the static trade-off theory. For example Lubatkin and Chatterjee 
(1994) and Pinegar and Wilbricht (1989) empirically find that increasing leverage 
protects firm shareholders from excessive monitoring expenses. Similarly Vos and 
Forlong (1996) find that both agency costs and agency benefits of debt are significant for 
more mature firms. Their study shows that there is variation between small and mature 
firms as small firms experience negative agency benefits of debt. Thus it appears that 
agency costs and agency benefits of debt strengthen during the life cycle of a firm (Vos 
& Vorlong 1996: 209).  
 
2.4.2. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIRM LEVERAGE AND GROWTH 
OPPORTUNITIES 
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When firms generate free cash flows they have the opportunity to either distribute the 
funds to their shareholders or invest to new projects. Jensen (1989) argues that managers 
tend to rather invest in projects with negative NPV as manager compensation tends to 
increase with firm size. Investments to negative NPV projects might increase firm size 
but not its value since they possess negative expected value. Similarly Lang, Stulz and 
Ofek (1996) find evidence that there exists a negative relation between firm leverage and 
growth. They argue that highly levered companies are not able to finance new projects 
and firms with negative NPV growth opportunities are likely to be prohibited from 
engaging in new projects. 
 
Correlation of leverage ratio and growth opportunities also varies between high- and low-
growth firms. Firms with low amount of future growth opportunities (measured by 
Tobin’s q) in fact face negative relation between firm leverage and growth. Lang et al. 
(1996: 22) point out that firms which face high amount of future growth opportunities are 
recognised by investors and thus explaining the results of insignificant correlation 
coefficient. 
 
2.4.3. FIRM PRODUCT MARKET INTERACTIONS AND OTHER STRATEGIC 
CHOICES ON CAPITAL STRUCTURE DECISIONS 
 
New scientific literature links firm capital structure decisions and product market strategy 
together. Firm leverage ratio affects equity’s rate of return which is also implicitly 
affected by firm product strategies. Product market strategy and leverage relationship idea 
was originally presented by Brander and Lewis (1986) and is based on Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) idea of higher debt levels influencing managers to undertake riskier 
projects. Brander and Lewis (1986) present a Cournot competition model (duopoly model 
in which firms can only compete in quantities) where firms increase risk through 
aggressive product strategy and thus choose higher debt level. Shareholders of levered 
companies receive positive rate of return only when firms are profitable (due to limited 
liability). As a consequence higher debt level induces firms to increase production. In the 
model firms have incentives to produce more since it causes their competitor to produce 
less. As a result both firms choose an equilibrium which includes positive debt levels and 
increased output. Brander and Lewis (1986) point out that firms in monopoly position or 
in highly competitive industries choose lower debt levels and lower output.  
 
These implications of industry effects on firm capital structure decisions are noteworthy 
and might further explain variation between firm leverage ratios. Titman and Wessels 
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(1988) suggest that firms with specialised product offering have lower leverage ratios 
than those with generalised offering. They further note that firm uniqueness within it’s 
industry measured by research and development expenses, marketing expenses and 
employee turnover seems to result in these firms choosing below industry-median debt 
levels. However for example Bowen, Daley and Huber Jr. (1982) note that tax shelters 
(resulting from e.g. investment tax credit, depreciation and operating loss carryforwards) 
have a significant role in explaining differences between intra-industry leverage ratios.  
 
It can also be argued that the relationships between firm product strategy, uniqueness, tax 
shelters and leverage ratios are not entirely evident. Harris and Raviv (1998) further note 
that strategic factors other than product prices and output have not been studied. These 
other strategic factors include e.g. targets of research and development expenses, firm 
production location, other product characteristics and advertising strategy. Also for 
example Showalter (1995) argues that in the duopoly model (by Brander and Lewis 1986) 
firm’s strategic debt choice depends on the uncertainty it faces. Despite of the above-
mentioned duopoly model being overly simplified, it is likely that debt can serve as a 
strategic tool. The magnitude of those strategic decisions can vary between different 
industries and thus industry effects in empirical research are worthy of noticing and 
controlling for. 
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3. CORPORATE FINANCING IN THE NORTHERN EUROPE 
 
There exists notable differences in firms’ capital structure choices and leverage ratios 
between different countries. Capital market development, legal environment and other 
factors help to explain these differences. This chapter aims to provide a general 
understanding of capital market development, legal environment, firms’ capital structure 
choices and other relevant characteristics in Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark and 
Iceland. 
 
Corporate lending environment has changed notably during the last five years as the 
aftermath of the financial crisis in 2009 created a demand for regulatory reforms. 
Implementation of Basel III, particularly through stricter capital requirements, is 
estimated to increase lending rates (Cosimano & Hakura 2011). Thus firms have begun 
to diversify their funding which has resulted in a clear increase in the use of bonds. As a 
result, albeit not being the only factor, the Nordic debt security market has developed 
significantly since 2009. 
 
The Nordic countries are relatively integrated and are thus similar in many aspects. 
Corporate lending is still very bank concentrated in all Nordic countries. The Nordics 
countries share a Scandinavian legislation principle and the financial market legislation 
is similar. Same large Nordic banks have significant presence in all Nordic countries and 
the countries share a common stock exchange with the exception of Norway. Thus also 
the corporate bond market is under the same stock market (i.e. Nasdaq OMX). 
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Figure 3. Percentage of bonds of total assets. Abildgren, Jensen, Kristoffersen, Kuchler, Stroger Hansen 
and Skakoun 2014: 74 
Averages for firms with quoted shares from the 1st quarter of 1999 to the 4th quarter of 2013. Red line 
presents the EU15 average for the same period 
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Figure 3 presents the average percentage of bonds in firm’s balance sheet from 1999 to 
2013. The figure shows that there exists notable differences in the usage of bonds between 
different countries. The difference can be explained by either differences in firms’ 
leverage ratios or in the usage of bank financing. Nevertheless the Nordic firms differ 
from more widely studied US firms which creates an opportunity to study pecking order 
among firms with different financing structure. The Nordic countries are generally 
considered as developed markets meanwhile their bond markets are rather 
underdeveloped (see e.g. Dow Jones or MSCI classification for developed markets). In 
order to achieve a better understanding of the Nordic corporate financing market each 
studied country is briefly explained in the next sections. 
 
3.1. SWEDEN 
 
Swedish corporate financing market has generally been dominated by bank loans. Equity 
has been the second most used instrument and bonds are the third. Bilateral bank loans 
constitute the majority and syndicated bank loans only a minor portion of the total 
financing. Today approximately 80% of loan-based funding of firms originates from 
banks while the remainder constitutes of foreign and local corporate bonds and 
commercial papers. However debt securities (i.e. commercial papers and bonds) have 
been outperforming bank loans continuously from 2011. Issues of debt securities have 
been growing over 10% annually for the past 5 years while bank lending has seen a 
relatively modest growth of circa 5% p.a. (Bonthron 2014)  
 
Annual statistics from Sveriges Riksbank (2014) show that the debt security issue 
volumes in Sweden grew moderately in the beginning of 21th century but saw a sharp 
decline in 2008. Since 2010 then the volumes rebounded and have been growing rapidly. 
At the same time the first high-yield corporate bonds were introduced to the Swedish 
market. Followed by the high-yield issues also the amount of firms without a credit rating 
have gained an increasing share of the annual issue volumes. Therefore it seems that 
investment grade bonds market has seen more steady growth while the total issues growth 
has been driven by new firms.  
 
According to the central bank of Sweden, Sveriges Riksbank (2014), corporate debt 
security issues have increased by approximately 25% since 2011. The vast growth stems 
from various changes in the corporate lending market. Banks face increasing regulation 
in terms of capital requirements and liquidity requirements. For example Bonthron (2014) 
argues that Swedish debt securities market growth derives from decline in banks’ 
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willingness to lend. As a result firms might not be able to acquire sufficient funding from 
banks and have switched to bond markets. Also demand side has changed greatly as 
interest rates have dropped down to historically low rates. Investors are seeking higher-
risk securities to meet yield targets and corporate debt securities offer an alternative. 
Bonthron (2014) argues that these factors assure that the Swedish bond securities market 
to continues to grow at a faster pace than the bank lending volumes. 
 
Swedish equity and debt markets are relatively developed and closely regulated. However 
the secondary market for debt securities is nonexistent as a vast majority of trading takes 
place over-the-counter (Riksbank 2014). The largest Swedish banks, Handelsbanken, 
Nordea, SEB, Swedbank and Danske Bank, handle most of the primary and secondary 
market transactions. According to Gunnarsdottir and Lindh (2011) numerous initiatives 
have been taken by the market participants to develop secondary markets for debt 
securities. Increased transparency, implementation of Basel III and Solvency II as well as 
continuing low interest rates are expected to be essential for the Swedish debt securities 
market to outperform the bank lending market. 
 
3.2. FINLAND 
 
Market capitalisation of quoted shares in Finland has varied around EUR 150bn during 
the past few years while the amount of outstanding debt has been growing steadily. 
Finnish corporate lending market is relatively bank centered as today only approximately 
30% of firm lending generates from debt securities. Nevertheless debt securities have 
been growing while bank lending stock has remained stable for the past five years 
according to the Bank of Finland statistics. The Bank of Finland reports annual growth 
rates for all bonds issued in Finland which therefore includes also bonds from financial 
firms and the central government. Annual growth rate has been around 6% while the 
corresponding rate for other euro countries has been around 1%. 
 
Non-financial firms account for around 15% of debt security issues in Finland. The debt 
security market in Finland has been growing faster than the EU has on average. A vast 
majority of bonds are issued by large firms while only a few of these have credit ratings. 
Similarly as in Sweden, Finnish bond market has been relatively underdeveloped but has 
shown signs of development during the past few years. According to the Bank of 
Finland’s report (2013) the total firm lending in Finland has been increasing steadily 
through debt securities which signals increases in leverage. 
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Finnish banking market is similar to Swedish as Nordea, SEB, Danske Bank and 
Handelsbanken handle most of the issuances. Also the local OP Group is a significant 
operator in Finland. Basel III and Solvency II are also implemented in Finland (Bank of 
Finland 2013). According to Gunnarsdottir and Lindh (2011) the implementation of these 
regulatory initiatives are expected to contribute positively to debt securities market’s 
growth. Finnish and Swedish banking markets appear to be relatively integrated and 
therefore can be expected to share similar development in the future.  
 
3.3. DENMARK 
 
Similar to it’s Nordic counterparts in the EU, Danish firms have historically preferred 
bank loans over debt securities. According to data from the National Bank of Denmark 
the Danish bond market grew over 10% annually. A comprehensive study by Abildgren, 
Jensen, Kristoffersen, Kuchler, Stroger Hansen and Skakoun (2014) describes the Danish 
corporate lending market. The study shows that Danish firms use debt as the primary 
financing instrument. Nevertheless while Danish firms are close to EU average leverage 
ratio the share of bonds in firm balance sheets is notably lower than the EU average.  
 
Danish firms were on average more levered in 2009 than they are today. Average leverage 
ratio rose steadily in the early 2000s but has since then decreased. Firms have been halting 
investments in order to pay down loans which is shown as a savings surplus. 2009 showed 
a notable change in Danish corporate lending behavior as mortgage backed bank lending 
surpassed traditional bank lending. For the past five years the development has continued 
as mortgage bank lending has continued to increase while traditional lending has been 
decreasing at the same time. (Danmarks Nationalbank 2015) 
 
Nykredit, Nordea and Danske Bank are the largest banks in Denmark of which Danske 
Bank is the largest. Smaller local listed banks Jyske Bank and Sydbank are also 
noteworthy lenders. Similar to other Nordic countries, Basel III and Solvency II are also 
being implemented in Denmark (Abildgren 2014). Therefore the Danish corporate 
lending market seems to follow the same pattern as Finnish and Swedish counterparts. 
Debt securities market can be expected to continue growing as banks face tighter 
regulation. (Gunnarsdottir and Lindh 2011) 
 
3.4. NORWAY 
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Norway differs slightly from other Nordic countries. Firms have historically been more 
levered and have also historically used more bonds in their financing (Abildgren et al. 
2014). Also the local debt security market is generally considered more developed than 
in other Nordic countries. Althought Norwegian non-financial firms have access to a 
developed bond market they still prefer bank financing as approximately 70% of debt is 
raised from banks (as of 2012 according to Statistics Norway).  
  
Net issuance of debt securities by non-financial Norwegian firms has been positive each 
year for over 10 years (with the exception of 2008). Thus it seems that average leverage 
ratios have been increasing during the last decade. A major contributor has been bonds as 
the total outstanding volume of corporate bonds has almost quintupled from 2002 to 2012 
according to Norges Bank’s statistics. Non-financial firms have accounted for around 
20% of total outstanding volume. On the other hand the growth has been faster among 
non-financial firms thus increasing their portion year-by-year. Similar to other Nordic 
countries, companies without credit rating and those categorised as high-yield firms 
account for a significant portion of the total outstanding amount. Also most of the growth 
has generated from these firms during the past five years. 
 
According to Norges Banks’ statistics (as of June 2014) the largest corporate lender in 
Norway is DNB Bank which handles circa 33% of gross lending to corporate sector. The 
large Nordic banks mentioned in previous sections, Nordea, Handlesbank and Danske 
Bank, have a total of c. 33% while smaller local savings banks and commercial banks 
constitute the rest (such as SpareBank and Eika). Local legislation is fairly similar to other 
Nordic countries as Basel III was implemented in 2013. Norway has also begun to 
impelement bank-related EU rules in Norwegian legislation in order to align financial 
market legislation with other European countries. (Norges Bank 2012) 
 
3.5. ICELAND 
 
Icelandic firms’ leverage ratios have been decreasing significantly since 2009. Local 
banking sector went through a major overhaul between 2008-2011 and thus, since the 
figures include all firms, the figures provided by the Central Bank of Iceland (2015) give 
somewhat a biased image. However the net lending from banks to non-financials firms 
has been positive for the past few years, indicating increases in leverage ratios for non-
financial firms. 
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Debt securities had a major role in corporate financing from early 2000s till the Icelandic 
banking crisis in 2008. The outstanding volumes have since then dropped but have shown 
some signs of recovery according to the Central Bank of Iceland (2015). Bonds issued by 
non-financial corporations account to approximately 10% of total outstanding volumes 
which constitute majorly of housing bonds and treasury bonds. Thus bank lending is the 
dominant financing instrument for non-financial corporations. 
 
The three largest Icelandic banks Arion Bank, Islandsbanki and Landsbankinn constitute 
approximately 98% of total assets of all commercial banks in Iceland (Bank of Iceland 
2015). Hence the banking sector differs from it’s counterparts as it is far less integrated 
to other Nordic countries. The Icelandic banking sector has implemented Basel III 
regulatory reforms and is in that sense similar to other Nordic countries. 
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4. DATA, HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The data, descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients are presented below in section 
4.1. In section 4.2 hypotheses are stated and in section 4.3 the utilised methodologies are 
presented. 
 
4.1. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
The study is conducted with data consisting of firms from Northern Europe. The featuring 
firms were publicly listed on Nasdaq OMX Nordic stock exchange, Oslo Bors or some 
other local stock exchange list in 2014. The stock exchanges comprise firms 
headquartered in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland (refered as “the Nordic 
states” or “the Nordics”). The data is obtained from Orbis database and it includes 547 
firms of which 278 have continuous data available from 2005 to 2014. Each firm in the 
sample has detailed balance sheet, income statement and flow of funds data.  
 
The standard practice in capital structure studies is to exclude financial firms and 
regulated utilities. NACE Rev. 2 codes from 6400 to 6699 comprise firms engaged in 
financial and insurance activities and are thus excluded. Electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply firms are under codes 3500-3599 and are also excluded. Also firms 
that have delisted have been excluded from the sample. As the study attemps to closely 
follow the selection criterias of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal 
(2003), the study excludes firms with insufficient financial data, particularly those with 
gaps in or otherwise inadequate flow of funds data or data of debt amounts. These firms 
are generally small firms with less than 10m€ of assets. 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for those variables that are essential for the pecking 
order model for full sample period. The total net debt of firms experiences only minor 
negative skewness which means it is right modal. The distribution is also slightly 
leptokurtic which means that the distribution has fat tails and a higher peak. Investments 
items has also negative skewness and is leptokurtic. It should be noted that negative 
investments (minimum is -3.13) mean that the firm has sold more assets than it has 
invested in. 
 
Dividends items has positive skewness and kurtosis. Positive skewness means that the 
distribution is left modal which in turn indicates that there exists numerous firms with no 
annual dividend payments. Change in working capital and operating cash flow share 
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similar distribution characteristics. Both items have positive skewness and excess 
kurtosis.  
 
4.1.1. GENERAL DEVELOPMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS 
 
Average balance sheet items as percentages of total assets are presented in tables 1 and 2. 
The balance sheet data is relatively consistent over the period and varies only slightly 
between different countries. Percentages of some items have changed as in the whole 
sample the amount of intangible assets increased from 16.7% to 26.1% meanwhile the 
fraction of tangible assets decreased from 24.5% to 19.6%. On the other hand retained 
earnings and other equity item and interest-bearing debt items have remained stable 
throughout the period, indicating that firm capital structures have remained relatively 
unchanged. 
 
Data sets for Denmark, Norway and Finland each comprise of approximately 100 firms. 
Sweden’s sample is the largest with 297 observations in 2014. Iceland is at the same time 
significantly smaller market and featuring only 10 firms in the data sample. There are 
some differences in average balance sheets between different countries. This might be 
partially explained by industry differences. For example Norwegian stock market 
includes a vast amount of oil related companies which generally have below median 
working capital ratios (see e.g. Damodaran 2015). 
Descriptive statistics Total net debt Investments Dividends
Δ working 
capital
Oper. cash 
flow
Mean 0.16 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.08
Median 0.17 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.08
Maximum 1.93 0.96 2.79 1.92 1.94
Minimum -0.99 -3.13 0.00 -1.69 -1.09
Std. Dev. 0.26 0.13 0.07 0.09 0.12
Skewness -0.44 -4.44 25.67 1.90 1.01
Kurtosis 5.02 108.21 942.45 143.42 40.49
Observations 4324 4324 4324 4324 4324
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Table presents descriptive statistics of those variables that are essential for pecking order model for all 
listed companies for full sample period. Financial firms and regulated utilities are excluded from the data 
set. Values are calculated as a portion of total assets (book value)  
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There exist notable differences in Nordic data sample compared to the US sample used 
by Frank and Goyal (2003). In their data of US-based firms they reported tangible assets 
to account for c. 30% and intangible assets approximately 8% of total assets. The Nordic 
firms appear to be less asset heavy and have more intangible assets in their balance sheet. 
The amount of long term debt is relatively even between the two data sets. The amount 
of equity is slightly higher in the Nordic sample. 
 
Tables 3 and 4 present average dividends, net investments, changes in working capital, 
internal cash flow and net profit as percentages of total assets. Firm financing deficit is 
calculated as sum of paid dividends, net investment expenditures and change in working 
capital subtracted by internal cash flow. Global financial turmoil is clearly shown as lower 
average net profits and internal cash flows. However financial deficit actually decreased 
due to changes in dividend, investment and working capital policies. Firms seem to have 
lowered their dividend payouts, halted investments and freed up working capital. 
Table 2. Averages of balance sheet item as a percentage of total assets (1/2) 
Table presents average balance sheets for Danish, Norwegian and Swedish listed companies for selected 
years. Financial firms and regulated utilities are excluded from the data set. Values are calculated as a 
portion of total assets (book value) and then averaged across all firms with adequate financial data in that 
year. 
Country
Year 2005 2009 2014 2005 2009 2014 2005 2009 2014
Fixed assets
Intangible assets 10.5 % 15.5 % 21.5 % 14.1 % 17.8 % 21.1 % 21.4 % 28.4 % 30.1 %
Tangible assets 31.6 % 30.7 % 23.8 % 31.2 % 28.6 % 30.8 % 18.0 % 17.0 % 13.8 %
Other fixed assets 8.8 % 10.5 % 13.4 % 11.5 % 12.3 % 12.7 % 11.6 % 10.3 % 14.2 %
Current assets
Inventories 13.6 % 13.2 % 12.0 % 7.9 % 7.3 % 8.6 % 13.1 % 11.6 % 13.2 %
Account receivables 17.3 % 14.0 % 13.0 % 12.3 % 9.6 % 11.1 % 16.4 % 15.6 % 15.1 %
Other current assets 22.7 % 21.8 % 23.4 % 26.7 % 27.1 % 22.8 % 26.0 % 22.1 % 22.0 %
Cash 15.2 % 13.5 % 13.8 % 19.4 % 18.2 % 14.0 % 18.9 % 13.8 % 14.3 %
Total assets 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
Equity
Capital 13.5 % 13.8 % 14.6 % 17.6 % 12.0 % 7.3 % 12.4 % 10.9 % 8.9 %
Retained earnings and other equity33.3 % 33.0 % 36.1 % 24.1 % 32.9 % 37.2 % 37.9 % 37.5 % 41.5 %
Non-current liabilities
Long term debt 16.2 % 19.0 % 17.7 % 24.5 % 23.5 % 25.1 % 15.0 % 15.6 % 16.9 %
Other non-current liabilities 5.7 % 4.8 % 4.8 % 6.1 % 6.6 % 6.0 % 5.6 % 5.7 % 5.6 %
Current liabilities
Short term debt 9.4 % 10.4 % 8.3 % 8.9 % 9.5 % 7.5 % 7.1 % 6.8 % 8.4 %
Account payables 8.5 % 6.7 % 8.5 % 8.4 % 6.5 % 7.1 % 9.1 % 8.7 % 8.4 %
Other current liabilities 14.6 % 14.5 % 13.9 % 15.7 % 13.1 % 16.0 % 16.0 % 17.8 % 16.4 %
Total equity and liabilities 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
Number of observations 87 96 87 69 87 104 187 246 297
Denmark Norway Sweden
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There exist some noteworthy differences between the Nordic countries. For example the 
average net profit of Norwegian firms was negative in 2014 compared to positive figures 
in other Nordic countries. Recent downturn in oil price and oil investments appear to have 
an effect on the figures as the Norwegian data sample is relatively dominanted by the 
local offshore and onshore industries. 
 
In their data sample Frank and Goyal (2003) observed cash dividends varying on average 
between 5% and 15% of total assets from 1971 to 1998. Average investments varied 
between 8% and 12% while changes in working capital were c. 2%. Internal cash flows 
were on average c. 10% of total assets between 1971 and 1980. However cash flows 
decreased relatively linearily being -0.3% in 1998. Financing deficits increased from 4% 
in 1971 up to 13.5% in 1998. In the Northern Europe firms appear on average to have 
lower dividend payments and investments. Internal cash flow shows similar variation 
depending on the underlying economic situation. 
Table 3. Averages of balance sheet item as a percentage of total assets (2/2) 
Table presents average balance sheets for Icelandic, Finnish and all listed companies for selected years. 
Financial firms and regulated utilities are excluded from the data set. Values are calculated as a portion of 
total assets (book value) and then averaged across all firms with adequate financial data in that year. 
 
Country
Year 2005 2009 2014 2005 2009 2014 2005 2009 2014
Fixed assets
Intangible assets 32.6 % 32.1 % 33.3 % 14.5 % 21.1 % 22.2 % 16.7 % 23.1 % 26.1 %
Tangible assets 25.9 % 27.7 % 28.1 % 25.9 % 23.1 % 20.3 % 24.5 % 22.6 % 19.6 %
Other fixed assets 9.1 % 5.4 % 5.6 % 9.4 % 9.9 % 10.2 % 10.5 % 10.5 % 13.0 %
Current assets
Inventories 11.6 % 12.0 % 12.2 % 15.1 % 14.1 % 15.5 % 12.7 % 11.7 % 12.6 %
Account receivables 16.4 % 10.1 % 11.9 % 18.4 % 15.6 % 16.4 % 16.3 % 14.3 % 14.3 %
Other current assets 4.4 % 12.6 % 12.9 % 18.5 % 18.2 % 18.6 % 23.7 % 22.0 % 21.7 %
Cash 2.8 % 5.0 % 8.6 % 12.5 % 12.1 % 11.7 % 16.8 % 14.0 % 13.6 %
Total assets 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
Equity
Capital 5.0 % 3.5 % 6.0 % 11.0 % 12.4 % 11.4 % 13.1 % 11.8 % 9.8 %
Retained earnings and other equity31.2 % 23.5 % 45.2 % 34.9 % 29.5 % 26.8 % 34.1 % 34.3 % 37.6 %
Non-current liabilities
Long term debt 34.7 % 33.2 % 20.9 % 15.5 % 20.6 % 18.5 % 17.0 % 18.7 % 18.9 %
Other non-current liabilities 6.4 % 3.5 % 3.2 % 5.4 % 5.5 % 6.3 % 5.7 % 5.6 % 5.6 %
Current liabilities
Short term debt 8.0 % 16.7 % 4.7 % 7.4 % 8.4 % 9.8 % 8.0 % 8.4 % 8.4 %
Account payables 13.5 % 7.7 % 7.6 % 8.8 % 7.2 % 10.0 % 8.9 % 7.7 % 8.4 %
Other current liabilities 1.3 % 12.0 % 12.5 % 17.9 % 16.8 % 18.6 % 15.9 % 16.2 % 16.3 %
Total equity and liabilities 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
Number of observations 4 7 10 87 95 95 434 531 593
TotalIceland Finland
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As discussed earlier, the economic downturn period of 2008-2009 showed decreases in 
firms’ internal cash flows. The US economy experienced similar downturns in 1980s and 
1990s which help to explain increases in financing deficit. The data set used by Frank and 
Goyal (2003) experiences similar variation as the data set used in this study and will thus 
provide a convincing comparison point for the results. 
 
4.1.2. CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
 
Table 5 presents Pearson correlation coefficients between total gross debt issued, 
investments, dividends, change in working capital and operating cash flow. Damodar 
(2004) defines sample Pearson correlation coefficient in the following way. The 
definitions are commonly used in economteric literature, Ӯ and 𝑥̄ are are the sample 
means for y and x. 
Table 4. Averages of financial requirement and profitability item as a percentage of total assets (1/2) 
Table presents average balance sheets for Danish, Norwegian and Swedish listed companies for selected 
years. Financial firms and regulated utilities are excluded from the data set. Values are calculated as a 
portion of total assets (book value) and then averaged across all firms with adequate financial data in that 
year. 
 
Table 5. Averages of financial requirement and profitability item as a percentage of total assets (2/2) 
Table presents average balance sheets for Icelandic, Finnish and All listed companies for selected years. 
Financial firms and regulated utilities are excluded from the data set. Values are calculated as a portion of 
total assets (book value) and then averaged across all firms with adequate financial data in that year. 
Country
Year 2005 2009 2014 2005 2009 2014 2005 2009 2014
Cash dividends (1) 3.0 % 1.0 % 2.1 % 4.9 % 2.0 % 1.8 % 2.3 % 2.4 % 3.1 %
Investments (2) 7.4 % 6.4 % 4.4 % 10.6 % 5.2 % 7.0 % 8.6 % 4.6 % 6.5 %
Δ working capital (3) 3.2 % -1.6 % 2.5 % 1.5 % -2.1 % 1.2 % 2.5 % -2.2 % 1.2 %
Internal cash flow (4) 11.2 % 3.1 % 9.6 % 6.1 % -0.7 % 6.5 % 3.9 % 2.1 % 4.9 %
Financial deficit (1+2+3-4) 2.1 % 1.4 % -3.9 % 11.1 % 2.7 % 2.2 % 7.9 % 1.2 % 3.2 %
Net profit 10.0 % -1.2 % 2.3 % 5.0 % -6.0 % -1.1 % 1.8 % -5.2 % 1.6 %
Denmark Norway Sweden
Country
Year 2005 2009 2014 2005 2009 2014 2005 2009 2014
Cash dividends (1) 0.7 % 0.0 % 1.7 % 3.9 % 2.6 % 2.7 % 3.2 % 2.1 % 2.6 %
Investments (2) 17.6 % 3.0 % 6.4 % 3.5 % 4.1 % 2.5 % 7.7 % 4.9 % 5.6 %
Δ working capital (3) 1.4 % -0.4 % 1.0 % 4.9 % -0.6 % 2.5 % 2.9 % -1.7 % 1.6 %
Internal cash flow (4) 4.6 % 6.1 % 13.9 % 14.2 % 7.6 % 7.6 % 7.7 % 2.9 % 6.5 %
Financial deficit (1+2+3-4) 15.9 % -1.8 % -4.5 % -1.9 % -1.6 % -0.1 % 5.3 % 0.9 % 1.3 %
Net profit 3.4 % -1.7 % 8.5 % 11.5 % 1.8 % 1.1 % 5.9 % -3.3 % 1.3 %
TotalIceland Finland
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Investments appear to have a high and statistically significant correlation with debt 
issued. This follows closely the theory presented by Myers (1984) in which firms 
primarily finance investment opportunities with safe securities and rather forego 
investments opportunities if only risky financing options are available. Also changes in 
working capital shows notable correlation with debt issued. This implies that firm growth 
is in many cases financed with debt. 
 
Low correlation coefficients between changes in working capital and dividends and 
investments are expected since working capital is generally considered as a part of present 
business operations rather than correlating with dividends or investments. Thus as 
expected changes in working capital correlate quite heavily with operative cash flow. 
 
Myers (1984) also argues that dividends are sticky which means that firms do not alter 
their annual dividend payments based on their profits or investment opportunities. 
However the correlation between dividends and operating cash flow is 0.23 and 
statistically significant at 5% level.  
 
 
 
Pairwise correlation:
Total gross debt issued and independent 
financing deficit factors
Debt issued Investments Dividends
Δ working 
capital
Oper. cash 
flow
Debt issued 1.00
Investments 0.42 * 1.00
Dividends -0.02 -0.29 * 1.00
Δ working capital 0.14 * -0.07 * 0.04 * 1.00
Oper. cash flow 0.02 0.14 * 0.23 * 0.36 * 1.00
* Indicates significance at 5% level
** Indicates significance at 10% level
Table 6. Pairwise correlation of variables 
Table presents pairwise correlations and their statistical significance for total gross debt issued, 
investments, dividends, change in working capital and operating cash flow. Financial firms and regulated 
utilities are excluded from the data set. Values are calculated as a portion of total assets (book value) and 
then averaged across all firms with adequate financial data for all variables. 
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There exists a clear positive correlation which implies that firms in fact increase 
(decrease) their dividends when they achieve higher (lower) profits. Also opposite to 
Myers (1984) arguments, dividends and investments show significant negative 
correlation which implies that firms somewhat choose between investment opportunities 
and dividend payments. 
 
4.2. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
 
The hypotheses are based on the theoretical framework of pecking order theory and prior 
empirical studies. Especially studies from Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank 
and Goyal (2003) have an important role and are closely followed in the hypotheses. The 
hypotheses are presented and briefly commented below. 
 
H1: Firms follow pecking order behavior in financing – a unit change in debt is 
explained by an equal amount of financing deficit 
 
This hypothesis is the primary hypothesis of the pecking order theory. It originates from 
Donaldson (1961) whose study suggests that firms favor internal financing over external 
financing. When internal financing is insufficient firms issue debt over equity which 
implies a pecking order of internal over external financing and debt over equity financing. 
The theoretical framework for pecking order theory was constructed by Myers (1984) and 
Myers and Majluf (1984) who show that the pecking order of financing derives from 
information asymmetry between existing stockholders and firm management. The first 
hypothesis was first presented in a study by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and later 
followed by many researchers. In the aggregated pecking order model the slope 
coefficient is one and intercept term is zero. 
 
H2: The individual factors used to construct the aggregated model are equally 
important in explaining firms’ debt issued 
 
The aggregated pecking order model is constructed by combining dividends, investments, 
internal cash flow and change in working capital into a single financing deficit factor. 
Pecking order theory explains firm financing behavior only if each of these factors follow 
pecking order theory. Disaggregating the model would reveal if firms for example use 
debt to finance dividends but equity to finance working capital. Thus for pecking order 
theory to be relevant 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑉 = 𝛽𝐼𝑁𝑉 = 𝛽𝛥𝑊𝐶 = 𝛽𝐶 = 1. If this holds then aggregated model 
is justified but in the other case an alternative model would be required. 
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H3: The pecking order theory performs equally well when including all currently 
publicly listed firms 
 
Originally Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) use data set which excludes firms without 
continuous financial data for the full sample period. Later Frank and Goyal (2003) argue 
that the pecking order theory does not require continuous data as the model is static. The 
only variable which requires data from two consecutive year is the change in debt in 
firm’s balance sheet. The tests are repeated for both the full data sample and firms with 
continuous financial data. For the third hypothesis to hold, the results should be equal for 
both data samples. 
 
H4: Implementation of stricter bank financial regulation has resulted in decrease in 
firms’ debt based financing 
 
De Haan and Hinloopen (2003) argue that firms follow a financing sequence of internal 
cash flows, bank debt, equity and then bonds. As a result pecking order should perform 
better in countries with bank centered lending environment and vice versa. Tightening 
financial market regulation has played an important role in the recent development of 
Nordic bond market. Thus the fourth hypothesis states that pecking order performs better 
before the financial crisis than it does after it. 
 
 
4.3. METHODOLOGY 
 
In this section the variables and methodologies are described. Microsoft Excel 2007 and 
EViews 7 are used to analyse and present the data. 
 
4.3.1. AGGREGATED MODEL OF PECKING ORDER THEORY 
 
Pecking order model suggests that if firm’s cash flows are insufficient to finance annual 
dividend payments, investments and changes in working capital the firm will issue debt. 
In order to test the pecking order the following variables and notations are defined: 
 
 
𝐶𝑡  = cash flow after interest and tax payments 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡 = cash dividends 
38 
 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡 = net investments in fixed assets  
𝛥𝑊𝐶𝑡 = change in working capital 
𝛥𝐷𝑡 = change in book debt 
𝛥𝐸𝑡 = change in net equity issued 
 
With these notations the following aggregation of financing deficit is formed: 
 
(2) 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑡 = 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡 + 𝛥𝑊𝐶𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡   
  
The financing deficit can then be financed with either debt or equity. Therefore to test the 
pecking order theory, the following empirical model is specified 
 
(3) 𝛥𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡   
   
Hence the pecking order theory hypothesis is that 𝛼 = 0 and 𝛽1 = 1. This would imply 
that the financing deficit is fully financed with long term debt. Both Frank and Goyal 
(2003) and Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) use the respective model. 
 
4.3.2. DISAGGREGATED MODEL OF PECKING ORDER THEORY 
 
Frank and Goyal (2003) point out that there might be information in one or more of the 
factors forming financing deficit. Therefore running an alternative regression with 
individual variables is justified. Changes in issued debt might be driven by individual 
factors. However in order for the pecking order theory to perform each variable’s 
coefficient should be the same 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑉 = 𝛽𝐼𝑁𝑉 = 𝛽𝛥𝑊𝐶 = 𝛽𝐶 = 1. If it holds then 
aggregated model is justified but in the other case an alternative model is required. 
 
(4) 𝛥𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽𝛥𝑊𝐶𝛥𝑊𝐶𝑡 − 𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡  
 
4.3.3. CONTROLLING FOR CHANGES IN FIRM OPERATIONS  
 
Year fixed effects are included to control for variation in firm operations over time. 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003) posses data which allows 
them to exclude firms that have taken major restructurings, mergers or other corporate 
deals. Orbis database does not provide information for corporate restructurings, mergers 
and other corporate deals and thus it is not possible to eliminate these from the data 
sample. Adding year fixed effects minimises the effects of corporate deals. 
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There might also exist unobserved heterogeneity due to one or more omitted firm specific 
characteristics. These characteristics might be related to debt constrains which might can 
result in firms to prefer equity over debt and lead to bias in results. As a result firm fixed 
effects are justified to reduce potential endogeneity problems.  
 
As a result aggregated pecking order model transforms into the following two-way fixed 
effects regression specification: 
 
(5) 𝛥𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼𝑘𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑖
𝑘 +𝑛−1𝑘=1 ∑ 𝜔𝑦𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑦2014
𝑦=2005 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
 
4.3.4. ADDITIONAL TESTS 
 
There also exists different methods for proxying the changes of debt. Therefore the tests 
are replicated for total debt issuance, total net debt issuance, long term net debt issuance 
and changes in leverage ratio. Frank and Goyal (2003) point out that cash could be 
correlated with the amount of debt issued as firms might hold excess cash gained from 
either debt or equity issuances. Therefore, as Frank and Goyal (2003) argue, a robustness 
check separating cash is justified. This is conducted by using net debt instead of gross 
debt. This approach is ignored by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) but is used in Frank 
and Goyal (2003) and is thus tested separately. 
 
In most of the tests Nordic countries are merged into a single data sample. Nordic 
countries are relatively similar in many relevant ways, common legislative framework, 
accelerating development of financial markets and bank concentrated lending 
environment. As a result Nordic countries are merged into a single data sample to study 
financing patterns. However some Nordic country might lack statistical significance or 
results might deviate significantly from other Nordic countries. In this case results for  the 
combined data set might be driven by some individual countries. Thus merging would 
not be justified and there might exist country specific unobservable variables which drive 
the results for joint data sample. Merging is tested in section 5.3 
 
The corporate lending market has developed notably after the financial crisis in 2009. 
Regulatory reforms have shifted firm financing from banks to bond market. De Haan and 
Hinloopen (2003) show that there is a clear preference among firms to chooce bank debt 
over equity financing but equity financing over bond financing. Also for example 
Cosimano and Hakura (2003) show that implementation of Basel III has resulted in 
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stricter capital requirements and has thus increased lending rates. Therefore additional 
tests on with a period dummy variable are tested. 
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5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
In this chapter the results are presented. Firstly primary results for pecking order theory 
for the full sample period are presented in section 5.1. In section 5.2 additional tests on 
alternative selection criterias are presented. Section 5.3. includes regressions on 
individual Nordic countries. Lastly in section 5.4 results for changes in firm lending 
behavior after tightening financial regulation are presented. 
 
5.1. TESTS ON PECKING ORDER THEORY FOR THE FULL SAMPLE 
PERIOD 
 
This section includes results on aggregated and disaggregated pecking order model. 
 
5.1.1. REGRESSIONS ON AGGREGATED MODEL  
 
Tests on aggregated pecking order model with restriction for including only firms with 
continuous data are presented in table 5. Table 5 summarizes the results of ordinary least 
squares tests with fixed effects. The dependent variables are presented in columns 1-5. 
Values for the constant (𝛼) are presented in the first row, coefficients for financing deficit 
(𝛽1) in the second row, number of firms in the sample in the third and coefficient of 
determination (R²) in the last row. 
 
Regressions on long term gross debt issued and total gross debt issued show values for 
constant extremely close to zero. However neither is significant at 5% level and only the 
constant on long term gross debt issued is statistically significant at 10% level. 
Coefficients for financing deficit are around 0.4 and 0.6. The coefficient for total gross 
debt issued is in the right order of magnitude while long term. The coefficient of 
determination is 0.31 and 0.43 for long term gross debt and total gross debt issued, 
respectively. For both dependent variables the coefficients for financing deficit are 
significant at 5% level. Considering the simplicity of the model it performs decently. 
Hence these results for gross debt issuance indicate cautious support for the pecking order 
theory.  
 
Results in columns 3 and 4 use similar dependent variables but take into account firms’ 
cash and cash equivalent items. Again the values for constant are close to zero but neither 
is significant at 10% level. Coefficients for financing deficit are slightly higher than in 
the previous models and both are significant at 5%. Coefficients of determination are 
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slightly higher (0.43 and 0.57), implying a better fit for the model.  Thus the model 
performs relatively well with net debt as dependent variable.  
 
The results are fairly similar with change in leverage ratio as a dependent variable. Again 
the value for the intercept term is not statistically significant while coefficient for 
financing deficit is approximately 0.6 and statistically significant at 5% level. However 
the coefficient of determination is slightly lower than with net debt. This could derive 
from the fact that change in leverage ratio also implicitly includes changes in both book 
debt and book equity. Book profits have an effect on changes in leverage ratio and can 
thus bias the results. However R² is still at tolerable level considering the simplicity of 
the model and thus the model again performs decently. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results are highly similar to those from Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). They apply 
similar restrictions and study firms over 1971-1989 in the US. They find pecking order 
coefficients to vary between 0.75 and 0.85 depending whether the dependent variable is 
gross debt, net debt or change in debt ratio. Coefficient of determination is high for all 
tests in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). Frank and Goyal (2003) find similar results for 
net debt issued. However their findings for gross debt issued and change in leverage ratio 
slightly deviate from those of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999).  
Table 7. Tests on aggregated balanced pecking order model for the time period 2005-2014 
The sample consists firms with no gaps in financial data for the tested period of 2005-2014. Financials 
firms and regulated utilities are excluded. The following regression is estimated: 𝜟𝑫𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝑫𝑬𝑭𝒕 +
𝒆𝒊𝒕¸in which 𝜟𝑫𝒕is the amount of debt issued and 𝑫𝑬𝑭𝒕 is the financing deficit. Financing deficit is the 
sum of dividends, investments and the change in working capital minus the operating cash flow. All 
variables are scaled by firm’s total assets. The dependent variable is presented in colums 1 to 5. Leverage 
ratio is defined as total net debt to total assets. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Long term debt 
issued Total debt issued
Net long term 
debt issued 
Net total debt 
issued
Change in 
leverage ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
0.42 * 0.62 * 0.70 * 0.89 * 0.59 *
(0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Number of firms 278 278 278 278 278
R² 0.31 0.43 0.43 0.57 0.38
* Indicates significance at 5% level
** Indicates significance at 10% level
Financing deficit
Constant
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The most significant difference originates from the requirement for firms to report 
continuous data. Frank and Goyal (2003) argue that the pecking order theory does not in 
theory require the use of continuous data. They show that the model loses a vast amount 
of statistical significance when examining a broader set of data. Similar behavior can be 
seen in table 6 which shows the same tests as in table 5 but without the requirement for 
firms to report continuous data for the sample period. 
  
The number of firms grows from 278 to 581 (and 34 firms either do not have or do not 
report short term debt in Orbis database) when continuous data requirement is removed. 
The pecking order theory performs best with long term net debt and total net debt issued. 
A broader pool of firms is found when firms are required to only report financing deficit 
and long term debt. Statistically the results for long term gross debt and total gross debt 
debt issued do not support the pecking order theory as the coefficient for financing deficit 
is relatively low. Also the R² drops significantly when a broader pool of firms is tested. 
 
The results for net debt issued are more supportive. Financing deficit appears to predict a 
major portion of changes in net debt. Intercept terms are practically zero and statistically 
significant at 5% level. Considering the high number of firms, statistical fit for the model 
is satisfactory (R² is 0.38 and 0.49 for net debt issued).  
Table 8. Tests on aggregated unbalanced pecking order model for the time period 2005-2014 
The sample consists firms with financial data for the tested period of 2005-2014. Financials firms and 
regulated utilities are excluded. The following regression is estimated: 𝜟𝑫𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝑫𝑬𝑭𝒕 + 𝒆𝒊𝒕¸in which 
𝜟𝑫𝒕is the amount of debt issued and 𝑫𝑬𝑭𝒕 is the financing deficit. Financing deficit is the sum of dividends, 
investments and the change in working capital minus the operating cash flow. All variables are scaled by 
firm’s total assets. The dependent variable is presented in colums 1 to 5. Leverage ratio is defined as total 
net debt to total assets. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
Long term debt 
issued Total debt issued
Net long term 
debt issued 
Net total debt 
issued
Change in 
leverage ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.00 0.00 -0.01 * -0.01 * -0.01 *
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
0.29 * 0.44 * 0.62 * 0.74 * 0.56 *
(0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Number of firms 581 547 581 547 547
R² 0.23 0.35 0.38 0.49 0.35
* Indicates significance at 5% level
** Indicates significance at 10% level
Constant
Financing deficit
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Frank and Goyal (2003) argue that the difference between the results of table 5 and 6 
stems from the fact that those firms that report continuous data are generally large and 
stable firms. Arguably large and stable firms are not as likely to be financially constraint 
as small and volatile firms. As Myers (1984) states that firms issue equity only if they are 
debt constraint. The data sample of table 6 potentially includes more firms that can be 
considered as debt constraint. For example the Nasdaq OMX First North market includes 
firms which can be, on average, considered as high growth, volatile and risky firms. 
 
As a conclusion the pecking order theory appears to perform well among more stable 
firms (based on continuous data requirement). The results are not dependent on which 
dependent variable is used however stronger when accounting for net debt issued. The 
lack of statistical significance for the intercept term is somewhat unexpected. One 
possibility is that there are firms which issue debt even if their cash flow generation does 
not require them to do so. For a broader set of firms the results are not as simple to 
conclude. The intercept terms are statisticall significant at 5% level for tests 3-5 and close 
to zero. For those firms that report both short and long term the pecking order theory 
predicts financing behavior well. However for an even broader set of 581 firms the results 
are less convincing. As discussed earlier, a possible solution is that there exists more noise 
in the results as the portion of smaller and more volatile firms increases in the sample. 
 
5.1.2. REGRESSIONS ON DISAGGREGATED MODEL  
 
For the following tests on disaggregated pecking order model the same restrictions as in 
table 5 are applied, meaning that only firms with continuous data are included. The results 
are presented in table 7. The financing deficit is dismantled into individual components. 
Similar to the aggregated model, the pecking order theory predicts that coefficients for 
investments, dividends and change in working capital are equal to one. Operating cash 
flow should have negative and an unit coefficient and the constant should be equal to 
zero. Disaggregation is tested to justify the aggregation of pecking order model’s 
financing deficit variable. 
 
Issuance of long term gross debt and total gross debt as dependent variables are tested in 
columns 1 and 2, respectively. In the first test the constant is close to zero and is 
statistically significant at 5% level. Coefficients for investments, dividends, change in 
working capital and operating cash flow are all statistically significant at 5% level. 
Neither of the variables are very close to their predicted values. Working capital and 
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operating cash flow in fact diverge notably from the predicted unit coefficient. Regression 
in column 2 with total gross debt issued as a dependent variable finds slightly higher 
values. However coefficients for working capital and operating cash flow are still 
relatively far away from their predicted values. The intercept term is again close to zero 
and statistically significant at 5% level. Coefficient of determination is fairly moderate 
(0.36 and 0.47) in both tests. 
 
In both gross debt regressions the coefficients for changes in working capital and 
operating cash flow are statistically significant at 5% level but notably below their 
predicted values. Both variables appear to have a relatively small effect on firms’ 
financing decisions. The lack of all variables being in the right order of magnitude implies 
that there might exists alternative coefficient patterns as suggested by Frank and Goyal 
(2003). The results from aggregated model might be driven by individual components 
rather than the combined financing deficit. 
Table 9. Tests on disaggregated balanced pecking order model for the time period 2005-2014 
The sample consists firms with no gaps in financial data for the tested period of 2005-2014. Financials 
firms and regulated utilities are excluded. The following regression is estimated: 𝜟𝑫𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝑫𝑰𝑽𝑫𝑰𝑽𝒕 +
𝜷𝑰𝑵𝑽𝑰𝑵𝑽𝒕 + 𝜷𝜟𝑾𝑪𝜟𝑾𝑪𝒕 − 𝜷𝑪𝑪𝒕 + 𝒆𝒊𝒕¸ in which 𝜟𝑫𝒕 is the amount of debt issued and 𝜶 + 𝜷𝑫𝑰𝑽𝑫𝑰𝑽𝒕 +
𝜷𝑰𝑵𝑽𝑰𝑵𝑽𝒕 + 𝜷𝜟𝑾𝑪𝜟𝑾𝑪𝒕 − 𝜷𝑪𝑪𝒕 is the financing deficit comprising of dividends, investments, the change 
in working capital and the operating cash flow. All variables are scaled by firm’s total assets. The dependent 
variable is presented in colums 1 to 5. Leverage ratio is defined as net debt to total assets. Standard errors 
are reported in parentheses.  
 
Long term debt 
issued Total debt issued
Net long term 
debt issued 
Net total debt 
issued
Change in 
leverage ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-0.02 * -0.03 * -0.01 * -0.02 * 0.0
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
0.56 * 0.77 * 0.73 * 0.94 * 0.55 *
(0.019) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
0.57 * 0.77 * 0.71 * 0.92 * 0.49 *
(0.037) (0.042) (0.046) (0.044) (0.043)
0.17 * 0.36 * 0.67 * 0.86 * 0.69 *
(0.028) (0.032) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033)
-0.19 * -0.33 * -0.59 * -0.73 * -0.62 *
(0.029) (0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034)
Number of firms 278 278 278 278 278
R² 0.36 0.47 0.43 0.57 0.38
* Indicates significance at 5% level
** Indicates significance at 10% level
Constant
Investments
Dividends
Δ working capital
Operating cash flow
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Similar to the results from aggregated model, columns 3 and 4 take into account cash and 
cash equivalents by using net debt as a dependent variable. All variables and the intercept 
term are significant at 5% level. The constant term and each coefficient is in the right 
order of magnitude. Especially the fourth tests performs exceptionally well considering 
the simplicity of the model. The data fits the statistical model fairly well, R²s is 0.43 and 
0.57 for net long term debt issued and net total debt issued, respectively.  
 
Change in leverage ratio as a dependent variable performs slightly weaker than net debt 
regressions. The coefficient of determination is lower but coefficients are relatively high 
and statistically significant at 5% level. However the intercept term is not statistically 
significant at 10% level while being zero. R² is at tolerable level and hence the model 
performs decently. 
 
There exists few possible explanations for interpreting diverging results from 
disaggregation. Relatively low coefficients for working capital can stem from it being 
financed with for example overdraft facility or factoring financing which might not be 
reported under short term interest-bearing debt in Orbis database. Quite unexpectedly 
operating cash flow explains changes in gross debt weakly and below investments and 
dividends. A possible explanation is that profits and gross debt do not correlate as heavily 
as is expected. Trade off theory predicts that more profitable firms should be more 
levered. On the other hand e.g. Titman and Wessels (1988) show that profitability and 
debt are negatively correlated. However neither expects the relationship to be close to a 
unit coefficient.   
 
North European firms appear to differ from US firms in dividends. Frank and Goyal 
(2003) find the coefficient for dividend negative for gross debt issued and positive for net 
debt issued. They argue that the diverging results between net and gross debt issued 
generate from differences between dividend paying and non-dividend paying firms. They 
propose that dividend paying firms issue on average less long term debt and thus also 
redeem less debt as non-dividend paying firms. Dividend paying firms are also on average 
larger and more profitable firms with smaller growth opportunities (i.e. smaller 
investment requirements). Frank and Goyal (2003) argue that firms do not directly issue 
long term debt to pay out dividends but use cash instead. Clearly results in table 7 show 
otherwise. 
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The reason for disaggregating the pecking order model is to determine whether 
aggregation of financing deficit is justified. Other possibility is that aggregated model are 
driven by individual components and thus another model should be used. The results in 
table 7 support aggregation although the coefficients for working capital and operating 
cash flow are slightly lower than what the theory predicts. 
 
5.2. ALTERNATIVE SELECTION CRITERIAS 
 
Frank and Goyal (2003) argue that pecking order theory does not explain financing 
patterns for a broad set of US firms. Therefore they try to identify sub samples of firms 
that would follow pecking order behavior more closely than their full sample does. They 
approach the problem through theory which suggests that firms facing adverse selection 
problems should follow pecking order theory more closely. Frank and Goyal (2003) then 
argue that smaller, more volatile and risky firms are more likely to face more severe 
adverse selection issues. Empirically they find that size is critical however results are 
opposite as large firms show support for pecking order theory while small firms do not.  
 
Frank and Goyal (2003) attempt to find alternative sub samples which could proxy for 
adverse selection problems and thus enhance pecking order behavior for US firms. 
Leverage or isolating firms that strictly pay dividends each year does not change the 
outcome in their findings. It is also possible that these factors are unable to proxy adverse 
selection and thus diverging results could stem from sub sample restrictions actually 
proxying debt constraint. Otherwise it would be concluded that US firms do not follow 
pecking order and some of the supporting results stem from e.g. trade off theory.  
 
In this study the pecking order theory performs better among more stable firms based on 
continuous data requirement. This is consistent with the results from Frank and Goyal 
(2003). The results for Nordic firms are not dependent on which dependent variable is 
used. However using net debt instead of gross debt enhances the performance of pecking 
order theory. Earlier it was suggested that a possible solution for the difference between 
balanced and unbalanced data sets is that there exists more noise in the results as the 
portion of smaller and more volatile firms increases with the unbalanced sample. To gain 
confirmation on this intuition and identify differences between the same sub samples as 
in Frank and Goyal (2003) similar tests are performed. There is also possibility that earlier 
results are driven by some sub samples which is also tested in this section. Table 8 
presents results on six different sub samples on both balanced and unbalanced data sets. 
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Pecking order is tested on aggregated model with total gross debt and total net debt issued, 
marked with (1) and (2) respectively.  
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The upper half of table 8 presents tests on aggregated pecking order model for firms with 
continuous financial data for full sample period. As a point of comparison, same tests 
with total gross and net debt issued show 0.62 and 0.89 coefficients for financing deficit, 
respectively. Both figures are statistically significant at 5% level while the intercept 
terms, despite being close to their predicted value of zero, are not statistically significant 
at 10% level. R² is 0.43 and 0.57 for total gross debt and net debt, respectively.  
 
Total net debt appears to support pecking order theory better than gross debt issued which 
is consistent between all six tests on sub samples. Using net debt includes slump sums of 
cash in firms’ balance sheets. A firm has an option to either issue debt to finance it’s 
financing deficit or use cash reserves. According to pecking order theory negative 
financing deficit (i.e. financing surplus) is used to pay down debt. Using net debt also 
implicitly includes the possibility that a firm keeps the surplus cash flow for future. 
Possible reasons to gather excessive cash, such as market frictions and transaction costs, 
are thus negated when using net debt instead of gross debt. 
 
Isolating firms which have strictly positive dividends each year does not enhance the 
performance of the model. Dividing firms into three categories based on their relative 
indebtness shows differing results for pecking order theory. It appears that high leverage 
firms follow pecking order model more closely than firms with low indebtness. On the 
other hand size does not seem to play significant role for firms’ financing behavior in 
terms of pecking order theory. These results contradict with the findings from Frank and 
Goyal (2003) and are robust on the dependent variable used. 
 
The bottom half of table 8 includes all Nordic firms which were publicly listed in 2014 
(with the exception of financial firms and public utilities). Results for aggregated model, 
as presented in table 6, are as follows. Coefficient for financing deficit is 0.44 and 0.86 
for total gross and total net debt issued, respectively. Intercept terms are close to zero. All 
values are statistically significant at 5% level with the exception of intercept term with 
total gross debt issued as dependent variable. Coefficient of determination is 0.35 and 
0.49, respectively. Similar to continuous data sample, regressions on total net debt follow 
pecking order theory more closely than on gross debt issued. 
 
Financing behavior of dividend paying firms does not differ from the full sample even if 
continuous data restriction is removed. It should be noted that the number of dividend 
paying firms increases by only 61 when continuous data restriction is removed (while 
total number increases by 269 firms). Suprisingly neither leverage nor size is able to 
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differentiate results for broader set of firms. It appears that none of the sub samples are 
able to significantly isolate groups of firms which would either follow pecking order 
theory more closely or deviate significantly from it. Therefore there exists two possible 
explanations, firsly these sub samples are unable to identify debt constraint firms or firms 
which are subject to more severe adverse selection problems. Secondly there might not 
exists a noteworthy amount of listed firms which are debt constraint or subject to severe 
adverse selection problems. 
 
The applied 1 000m€ total assets level might be too high to categorise Nordic firms 
between large and small. In fact there exists 220 Nordic firms with a maximum of 100m€ 
of total equity and liabilities of which 75 report continuous data. The tests in table 8 are 
duplicated for these firms and reported in table 9. The results do not notably deviate from 
larger firms or from the full sample. In fact for those 75 firms that report continuous data 
the pecking order theory performs extremely well. Frank and Goyal (2003) suggest that 
smaller firms are subject to more severe adverse selection problems and should therefore 
prefer debt over equity. Thus results in table 9 cautiously indicate that these 75 firms 
could in fact be subject to more severe adverse selection issues. However as most of the 
tests on alternative selection criterias support pecking order theory this conclusion should 
be considered only highly indicative. 
 
 
Total debt issued
Net total debt 
issued Total debt issued
Net total debt 
issued
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Constant -0.02 * -0.03 * -0.01 * -0.02 *
Financing deficit 0.60 * 0.95 * 0.31 * 0.78 *
Number of firms 75 75 220 220
R² 0.38 0.58 0.27 0.49
* Indicates significance at 5% level
** Indicates significance at 10% level
No gaps in financial data Gaps in financial data allowed
Table 11. Tests on aggregated pecking order model for the smallest firms 
Sample includes firms with total equity and liabilities lower than 100m€. Financials firms and regulated 
utilities are excluded. The following regression is estimated: 𝜟𝑫𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝑫𝑬𝑭𝒕 + 𝒆𝒊𝒕¸in which 𝜟𝑫𝒕is 
the amount of debt issued and 𝑫𝑬𝑭𝒕 is the financing deficit. All variables are scaled by firm’s total assets. 
The dependent variable is total gross debt and total net debt issued in columns 1 and 2 respectively. 
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5.3. REGRESSIONS ON INDIVIDUAL NORDIC COUNTRIES 
 
In previous regressions all Nordic countries were merged into a single data sample. 
Nordic countries share common legislative framework, similar development of financial 
markets, similar bank concentrated lending environment and relatively integrated 
economies. Therefore merging countries into a single data sample was justified. However 
if some Nordic countries lack of statistical significance for financing deficit or the 
variable is not in the right order of magnitude then the results might be driven by some 
countries individually. In this case merging would not be justified and there might exist 
country specific unobservable variables which drive the results for joint data sample. 
 
Table 8 presents results for aggregated pecking order model with firms which report 
continuous financial data for the full sample period of 2005-2014. Financial firms and 
public utilities are excluded. There are only 3 Icelandic firms which fill these restrictions 
and therefore results for Iceland are not available. The dependent variables are presented 
in columns 1-5. Values for the constant (𝛼) are presented in the first row, coefficients for 
financing deficit (𝛽1) in the second row, number of firms in the sample in the third and 
coefficient of determination (R²) in the last row. 
 
A data sample of 57 Danish firms shows financing behavior close to what pecking order 
theory predicts. Net long term and net total debt issued show financing deficit coefficient 
close to a unit and relatively high R². The coefficients are statistically significant at 5% 
level. Regressions on long term gross debt issued show lower value for the coefficient 
and moderate R². Regressions using leverage ratio show close to a unit coefficient and 
also moderate R². Intercept term is close to zero for each different dependent variable but 
are not statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
42 Norwegian firms reports continuous financial data for the full sample period. 
Estimations for financing deficit support the pecking order theory for each different 
dependent variable. However the intercept terms are not statistically significant at 10% 
level but are close to zero with the exception of leverage ratio. Coefficient of 
determination is varies between c. 0.4 and 0.5 for all tests. 
 
Sweden is notably larger market as there are 113 firms which report continuous data from 
2005 to 2014. Results for Swedish firms support the pecking order theory the slightly 
weaker than with Danish and Norwegian firms. Coefficients for financing deficit are in 
the right order of magnitude and statistically significant at 5% level for both regressions 
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using net debt issued. Test on gross debt issued and leverage ratio show coefficients close 
to 0.5 at highest. R² is at moderate level or at least at tolerable level for each test. Intercept 
terms are close to zero for each regression but only statistically significant for gross debt 
issued. 
  
Results for Finnish firms show similar pattern with other Nordic countries. Estimated 
values for financing deficit differ from their predicted values when using gross debt issued 
as the dependent variable. Both regressions on net debt issued show values which are in 
the right order of magnitude. Values for the constant term are again close to zero but are 
not statistically significant at 10% level. Coefficients of determination are at the same 
level with other Nordic countries.  
 
Coefficient of determination is similar for each Nordic country. For the merged data 
sample R² varies between 0.36 and 0.57. R² on Nordic data can be considered to be on a 
high level when comparing to other empirical studies from e.g. Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003). It should be noted that Swedish firms account for 
nearly half of the merged data sample’s firms. This implies that the results for the merged 
data sample are somewhat driven by Swedish firms although each country shows similar 
statistical fit for the model. 
 
Apart from few exceptions the evidence from individual Nordic countries is consistent 
with results from the merged data sample. A majority of the results shown in table 8 
support the pecking order theory. Thus as both the market characteristics and firm 
financing behavior are consistent across Nordic countries, merging Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, Finland and Iceland into a single data set is justified. Supportive results justify 
performing additional, more detailed, regressions on the merged data sample. 
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5.4. EFFECTS OF TIGHTENING FINANCIAL REGULATION 
 
In chapter 3 it was presented that the Nordic corporate lending environment has changed 
notably during the last five years in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008-2009. The 
crisis created a demand for regulatory reforms in Europe and in the US. As a result Basel 
III was implemented, resulting in stricter capital requirements: This in turn was estimated 
to increase lending rates (Cosimano & Hakura 2011) and thus result in firms to diversify 
their funding. Due to diversification firms have increased bond financing.  
 
Frank and Goyal (2003) study financing behavior of US firms and find results which do 
not support pecking order theory. At the same time the US corporate financing market is 
significantly less bank concentrated than the Nordic market. De Haan and Hinloopen 
(2003) show that there is a preference among firms to choose bank debt over equity but 
equity over bond financing. Creating a dummy variable for pre-financial crisis period 
enables studying whether the increased usage of bond financing has had an impact on 
firm choices between debt and equity financing. The results are presented in table 11 for 
firms with no gaps in financial data and also for the whole data sample. Column (1) shows 
tests with total gross debt issued and column (2) with total net debt issued.  
 
The regressions are adjusted for cross-sectional fixed effects while period fixed effects 
have been dropped due to using period dummy. Dummy approach can be used in 
econometrics to capture possible differences between the two time periods which in this 
case includes the implementation of stricter financial regulation. 2010 was chosen to be 
the year when a stricter financial regulation was implemented. Similarly Frank and Goyal 
(2003) study the pecking order theory in 1971-1989 and 1990-1998. However they 
choose to simply compare the coefficients instead of testing whether the differences are 
statistically significant. The results in table 11 provide a more statistical approach for the 
comparison of two time periods. 
 
Firstly, the results for those 278 that have no gaps in financial data are fairly similar for 
both dependent variables. Similarly to previous tests the coefficient for financing deficit 
is higher when including cash and cash equivalents. The intercept terms are close to zero. 
All variables are statistically significant at 5% level. The year-dummy is slightly above 
zero and statistically significant at 5% level. The lack of  magnitude on the dummy 
variable means that there is only a minor change in firm financing behavior after the 
financial crisis. The coefficients of determination show decent statistical fit for the 
models. 
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Secondly, the results for the full sample of firms do not deviate significantly from the first 
set of tests. The coefficients for financing deficit are slightly lower and show a similar 
difference between gross and net debt issued as the dependent variable. For both tests the 
beta coefficients are statistically significant at 5% level. The intercept terms are also close 
to zero and statistically significant at 5% level. The year-dummy variables are also 
slightly above zero and statistically significant at 5% and 10% level for total gross debt 
issued and total net debt issued, respectively. Also the R²’s show decent statistical fit for 
both models. 
 
A positive figure for the year-dummy is necessary for being able to state that the pecking 
order theory performs stronger before the financial crisis. However the lack of magnitude 
on the dummy variable casts doubt on pecking order behavior diminishing after the 
financial crisis. Additional robustness checks were made in which the year of 
implementing stricter financial regulation was changed. The results are not dependent on 
the year proxying the implementation of stricter regulation as tests with year-dummy 
values ending in 2008, 2009 or 2010 show similar slightly positive and statistically 
significant values.  
 
Table 13. Tests on aggregated balanced pecking order model with periodical dummy 
The sample consists firms with financial data for the period presented on top row. Financials firms and 
regulated utilities are excluded. The following regression is estimated: 𝜟𝑫𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝑫𝑬𝑭𝒕 + ð𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓𝟏 +
𝒆𝒊𝒕¸in which 𝜟𝑫𝒕is the amount of debt issued and 𝑫𝑬𝑭𝒕 is the financing deficit. Financing deficit is the 
sum of dividends, investments and the change in working capital minus the operating cash flow. ð𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓𝟏is 
a dummy variable which divides the sample period into two periods. All variables are scaled by firm’s total 
assets. The dependent variable is total gross debt issued in column 1 and total net debt issued in column 2.  
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Constant -0.01 * -0.01 * -0.01 * -0.01 *
Financing deficit 0.62 * 0.89 * 0.46 * 0.75 *
Year-dummy 0.02 * 0.01 * 0.02 * 0.01 **
Number of firms 278 278 547 547
R² 0.42 0.56 0.34 0.48
* Indicates significance at 5% level
** Indicates significance at 10% level
No gaps in financial data Gaps allowed in financial data
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6. ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS 
 
In this chapter the results presented in previous chapter are summarised, analysed and 
compared against main pecking order theory studies. 
 
6.1. SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS 
 
Generally the pecking order theory performs fairly well and shows decent statistical fit. 
The relation between debt issued and financing deficit is clear and is on average near to 
a unit coefficient. Net debt as the dependent variable proxies debt issued more strongly 
than gross debt issued or change in leverage ratio. Also tests on total interest bearing debt 
issued outperform tests on long term interest bearing debt issued. The results are not 
dependent on the continuous data requirement while are however slightly stronger for 
these firms. Thus the first and the third hypotheses are accepted. 
 
These observations imply that it is important to account for both long and short term debt 
while also accounting for changes in firm cash reserves. Nordic firms appear to use both 
long and short term bank debt to finance their dividends, investments and working capital 
requirements. Nordic firms also seem to keep notable cash reserves which they later use 
for either investments, dividends or other operative requirements. It is also important to 
note that the pecking order theory does not only try to explain how firms finance negative 
cash flows but also implies that positive cash flows are used directly to pay down debt. 
 
Disaggregated pecking order model tests whether the individual factors used to construct 
the proxy for financing deficit are all equally important. As an example positive results 
would imply that aggregation of financing deficit factor is justified. On the contrary 
negative results would suggest that alternative patterns might be available or firms use 
equity to finance some of the individual factors. The results show that tests with net debt 
as the dependent variable support the aggregation of the pecking order model while gross 
debt and change in leverage ratio do not fully. Cash reserves appear to play an important 
role in the disaggregated model. Thus the second hypothesis is accepted on the condition 
of using net debt as the dependent variable. 
 
So far merging the Nordic countries into a single data set has remained unquestioned. 
Danish, Finnish, Swedish, Norwegian and Icelandic firms have been assumed to follow 
the same type of financing behavior since their underlying legislative framework is 
similar and the financial markets are integrated. The results support merging the Nordics 
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into a single data sample and are robust on most of the different dependent variables. The 
only exception is long term gross debt issued and particularly Finnish and Swedish firms. 
They show weak support for the pecking order theory. However since most of the tests 
support pecking order theory, merging the Nordics is justified.  
 
The last hypothesis suggests stronger support for pecking order theory for the period of 
2005 to 2009 than for 2010 to 2014. The difference between the two time periods is tested 
with a dummy variable. The dummy variable receives positive yet small values for all 
performed tests and is also statistically significant in all performed tests. Additional 
robustness checks do not alter the results. There exists only a marginal change in average 
lending behavior after the financial crisis. Therefore the fourth hypothesis is rejected. 
 
It should be noted that the coefficient for financing deficit is constantly below one which 
is an interesting observation since it implies that either a number of firms do not follow 
pecking order behavior closely or that firms also consider equity financing to e.g. adjust 
their optimal capital structure. 
 
6.2. PRIOR PECKING ORDER STUDIES 
 
In this section a summary of some selected prior pecking order studies is presented. Also 
a brief comparison to the results of this study is showed. Table 13 shows some selected 
prior pecking order studies. The scope of the table is to provide a brief overview of prior 
studies and therefore some of the most famous studies for and against pecking order 
theory are presented. Thus the table should be considered only as an comparison point 
and not as a broad meta-study on the matter. 
 
Tests of pecking order theory on US firms show highly mixed results. Generally studies 
conducted on earlier time period and on a more assorted data support pecking order theory 
more strongly than studies on a wide data sample. Some of the studies presented in table 
13 are not conducted directly to study pecking order theory. For example in Leary & 
Roberts (2005), they study tradeoff theory but find evidence for pecking order behavior. 
The US corporate lending market is more bond financing based and thus there should be 
a more limited support for pecking order theory.  
 
Lemmon and Zender (2010) provide an interesting approach as they propose that debt 
capacity is a highly important factor to control for in order to find support for pecking 
order theory. They note that previous researchers unsuccesfully use leverage ratio and 
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size as proxy for debt constrain. Then these results are generally interpreted to not support 
pecking order theory. Lemmon and Zender (2010) are succesful in separating debt and 
equity financing prefering firms with proxied debt capacity and bond ratings. It appears 
that while pecking order theory is unable to explain short term financing patterns for 
broad  range of US firms there exists sub samples which follow pecking order behavior 
closely. 
 
Tests of pecking order theory on European firms show generally more supportive results 
than studies conducted on US firms. This deviation likely derives from European market 
being more bank lending centered. However for example the UK corporate lending 
market is relatively bond centered and therefore for example Tucker and Stoja (2011) are 
able to find only a limited number of listed UK firms which follow the pecking order 
behavior of financing. The US and UK lending markets are fairly similar and thus similar 
financing patterns are logical. 
 
Watson and Wilson (2003) study the same market but use only small and medium sized 
firms which can be assessed as ones with limited access to bond and equity markets. They 
find strong evidence for pecking order theory from UK SMEs. Gaud et al. (2005) study 
financing behaviors across 15 European countries as a combined sample and are thus 
unable to control for differences between local lending markets. Their study shows poor 
support for the pecking order theory. On the other hand studies by Burlacu (2000) and De 
Haan and Hinloopen (2003) on Dutch and French firms show clear support for pecking 
order theory. 
 
The results from Nordic markets align with those from De Haan and Hinloopen (2003), 
Watson and Wilson (2003) and Burlacu (2000). Pecking order theory appears to quite 
well explain annual financing behavior in bank concentrated lending environments. 
However a noteworthy point of view is that not all firms are equally positioned to acquire 
equity or bond based funding. Therefore studies such as Burlacu (2000) which study a 
limited pool of firms shed new light to the pecking order behavior.  
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6.3. DISCUSSION ON THE RESULTS 
 
The study in this paper is a general approach to pecking order theory and thus studies 
from Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003) are closely 
comparable. As discussed earlier, the two studies find highly differing results for pecking 
order theory despite using data from same time period (Frank and Goyal, 2003 also extend 
the study to newer. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) argue that firms follow pecking 
order behavior closely while Frank and Goyal (2003) argue that only a limited number of 
firms follow pecking order and the behavior is less evident with more recent data. On the 
other hand Lemmon and Zender (2010) find less debt constraint firms from the same 
period to follow pecking order pattern of financing. Therefore it seems that in the US only 
some firms, those generally considered as large and stable firms and those considered less 
credit constraint, follow pecking order behavior of financing.  
 
The Nordic countries serve as a somewhat ideal environment for pecking order theory as 
there exists a notable amount of stable industrial firms and the local corporate lending 
market is bank concentrated. Therefore as expected the support for pecking order theory 
is strong in these countries. The local lending culture and the characteristics of the market 
appear to play an important role in firm financing decisions and firms appear to adapt to 
current conditions in a way which they believe to maximise their value. 
 
In various studies of pecking order theory size is seen as a critical factor. However 
different researchers interpret size to proxy different things. For Nordic firms size appears 
to proxy asymmetric information as debt is highly preferred for firms with less than 100 
million euro in assets. Size is also a difficult concept to compare in different markets as 
a firm considered small in one market might be considered medium sized in another 
market. For example the higher limit for small cap firms in Finland is 150 m€ in market 
capitalisation while the same limit in the US is approximately 2 bn$ (Nasdaq, 2015).  
 
6.4. LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
The results presented in this study should only be considered to hold for the used sample 
of Nordic firms. As stated in previous chapter, this study finds supportive results for 
pecking order theory in all used sub groups while previous researchers have been 
somewhat succesful in isolating firms subject to more severe adverse selection issues and 
more debt constraint firms. Thus additional research conducted with different proxies for 
adverse selection and debt constrain could yield interesting results. Basic classifications 
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such as size and leverage ratios could be replaced with more advanced classifications 
such as debt ratings. Since Orbis database does not provide debt ratings for firms, using 
those in this study is not an option. Also industry effects are widely excluded in pecking 
order theory studies but argued to affect optimal capital structure. Due to the lack of 
literature on the matter, industry effects are not in the scope of this paper. 
 
Orbis database provides financial data for the last 10 years. Therefore a study conducted 
with a longer data set would enable using additional subperiods and further studying 
effects of financial market development in the Nordics. For example the Dot-Com bubble 
and economic crises in the 90s would be interesting periods to study. Also a study 
concentrating solely on firm financing decisions in periods of economic expansion and 
downturn could be conducted with a longer data set. For example firms experience higher 
probability of bankruptcy in recession and more investment opportunities in expansion 
period which both can be expected to alter financing patterns. 
 
The study conducted in this paper provides a clear evidence of pecking order behavior. 
However the model used is a simplification of the real world financing patterns and 
excludes various factors effecting firm financing decisions. Therefore alternative 
approaches to create a more realistic and detailed picture of the choice between debt and 
equity financing would be beneficial. Understanding annual financing patterns is crucial 
to understand firms’ long term optimal capital structure choices. Different capital 
structure theories are often seen as competitors while the possibility of multiple applicable 
theories is often forgotten. 
 
The pecking order theory of financing has a stable position in applicable capital structure 
theories. It is often seen as a rather simplified model of real world corporate financing but 
contains multiple academically recognised features. Thus it can be expected to remain as 
one of the most studied theories in the field of corporate financing and to deserve 
additional research on unanswered questions. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This thesis studies the pecking order theory of corporate financing in North European 
economies. The main purpose is to find out whether listed Nordic firms follow pecking 
order behavior in their annual financing decisions. The second purpose is to investigate 
possible sub groups which deviate from the full sample in their annual financing 
decisions. Lastly the paper also studies whether the pecking order behavior loses strength 
after the financial reforms were applied in the aftermath of the financial crisis. 
 
The empirical results of this paper show strong evidence of pecking order behavior in 
listed North European firms. The results are robust for different measures of changes in 
firm debt levels. However it appears to be important to account for both long and short 
term interest bearing debt and also include cash reserves when measuring changes in firm 
debt levels. Nordic firms use both long and short term debt to finance their operations 
while also holding notable cash reserves. 
 
As the theory suggests, pecking order behavior should be more evident for firms subject 
to more severe adverse selection problems. At the same time, firms which are debt 
constraint are expected to deviate from pecking order behavior. The results in this paper 
are not truly able to isolate sub groups which notably deviate from the full sample. Size 
appears to be the only factor which has a significant role in the Nordic data sample as the 
smallest listed firms prefer debt over equity more strongly than the full sample. From 
publicly available accounting data, firm size is the most used proxy for adverse selection. 
As seen from this paper and various earlier studies, firm size is not able to strengthen 
findings of pecking order behavior. 
 
This paper uses a dummy variable for pre-financial crisis period which enables studying 
the effects of increased lending rates due to the implementation of Basel III. Increased 
lending rates are expected to result in firms starting to diversify their funding, increasing 
both equity and bond based financing. The results show positive yet marginal values for 
the dummy variable which implies only a marginal change in average lending behavior 
for Nordic firms after the financial crisis.  
 
This study covers the past 10 years of accounting information from North European firms 
which provides the latest available data for studying pecking order behavior. Thus the 
implications are timely and relevant for other researchers to compare to. Future research 
should be able to more accurately study the effects of tightening financial regulation as a 
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broader data of post-financial crisis becomes available. This study provides a noteworthy 
basis for extending the research of pecking order theory on both post-financial crisis 
period as well as on bank-centered lending environment.   
 
As a conclusion pecking order theory provides a noteworthy viewpoint at studying firm 
lending behavior. Among other capital structure theories it is based on simple 
assumptions but on the other hand it is not strictly dependent on any real world 
simplifications. Pecking order theory deserves a solid position among main capital 
structure theories and thus requires additional research. Especially novel financing 
instruments which shake up traditional border lines of debt and equity require additional 
research. Also the development and characteristics of national capital markets require to 
be noted and studied separately in order to develop new views of firm capital structure. 
Despite of development in financial markets since the work of Myers (1984), the original 
pecking order theory appears to still be a relevant theory in explaining firm financing 
decisions. 
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